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The Antitrust Case for Consumer Primacy
in Corporate Governance
Ramsi A. Woodcock*
Consumers have been left out of the great debate over the mission of the firm, in which
advocates of shareholder value maximization face off against advocates of corporate social
responsibility, who would allow management leeway to allocate profits to workers and other
non-shareholder insiders of the firm. The consumer welfare standard adopted by antitrust law
in the 1970s requires that firms allocate their profits neither to shareholders nor to workers
or other firm insiders. Instead, the standard requires that firms strive to have no profits at
all, by charging the lowest possible prices for their products. Such a profit-minimization
requirement, which, as federal antitrust law, would bind all state-level corporate law regimes,
would preserve incentives for businesses to perform efficiently because any incentive payments
necessary for efficiency count as costs, not profits, and could therefore be retained by firms.
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INTRODUCTION
The goal of antitrust law is to maximize consumer welfare.1 The welfare of
consumers is inversely proportional, however, to corporate profits, because
consumers pay for higher profits with higher prices.2 One might think, therefore,
that it is already well established that antitrust law, as federal law supreme over state
corporate law, imposes a duty on corporate management to minimize profits.3
One would, of course, be quite wrong. Instead, for many years it was
orthodoxy among professors of corporate law that firms not only have the right to
maximize profits but that they ought always to do so.4 Only in recent years has the
corporate social responsibility movement (CSR) succeeded at challenging that

1. The more common description of the goal of antitrust law as the protection of consumer
welfare, rather than the maximization of consumer welfare, is incorrect. See infra text and sources in
note 210.
2. As will become clear in just a few more paragraphs, I mean profits here in the economic
sense of revenues not necessary to cover any cost required for the firm to operate efficiently. By
contrast, increasing accounting profits can increase consumer welfare, if those profits are spent on
research and development of better products, for example. But economic profits are by definition net
of any such development costs. The distinction between economic and accounting profits is key to the
argument of this Article. For more detail on this distinction, see infra Part I.C.
3. For the antitrust laws, see, inter alia, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018).
4. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439, 440–41 (2000); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States,
1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1529–30 (2007).
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orthodoxy.5 But although CSR has fought for the right of firms not to maximize
profits, even CSR has never suggested that firms be prevented from maximizing
profits.6 Indeed, by expending great effort on establishing the related claim that
firms are free to distribute their profits to a range of groups, including workers and
local communities, rather than to shareholders alone, CSR has seemed to endorse
profit maximization as a legitimate, if not a required, goal of the firm.7
This stark contradiction within a single legal system, between an antitrust law
dedicated to minimizing profits and a corporate law that permits or even condones
maximization of profits, reflects the influence of Adam Smith’s invisible hand
theory on the basic rules governing the economy.8 That theory holds that
self-interested firms, each striving to maximize profits, compete product quality up
and prices down, inadvertently leaving consumers with the best products at the
lowest possible prices.9 Seemingly in an effort to implement this theory, corporate
law today protects the right of the firm to strive to maximize profits, while antitrust
law attempts to drive prices down and consumer welfare up by promoting
competition between firms.10

5. See LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 24–31 (2012) (making the CSR case);
Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 763 (2005)
(same); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power
and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 761, 764–66 (2015) (acknowledging the CSR position but arguing that boards should
nevertheless favor shareholders because shareholders can remove them). But see David G. Yosifon, The
Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181, 190–92 (2013) (arguing that CSR gets the law
wrong, at least in Delaware). The “corporate social responsibility” label has been put to many uses
across a number of disciplines. See R. EDWARD FREEMAN ET AL., STAKEHOLDER THEORY: THE
STATE OF THE ART 235 (2010). For example, a recent history of CSR, which dates the modern form
of the movement to the 1950s, cites only literature from the field of management science. See Archie
B. Carroll, A History of Corporate Social Responsibility: Concepts and Practices, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 19, 20, 43–46 (Andrew Crane et al. eds., 2008).
In this Article, CSR refers to those lawyers and economists who argue that the firm has a legal right to
do other than maximize shareholder value. See FREEMAN ET AL., supra, at 251 (discussing this corner
of CSR). CSR and shareholder primacy are not the only constellations in the galaxy of schools of
thought regarding corporate mission. A mapping of that galaxy may be found in Id. at 30–63.
6. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
7. See STOUT, supra note 5, at 31.
8. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 572 (Edwin Cannan ed., Bantam Dell 2003)
(1776) (discussing the invisible hand).
9. See ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 314, 550 (1995). Smith
thought well of competition but attributed the effectiveness of the invisible hand to self-interested
behavior generally rather than competition in particular. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE
NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 92, 273 (1801). Modern economics has shown
that competition is required for self-interested behavior to lead to economic efficiency. See
MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra, at 549.
10. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 442 (arguing that corporate law strives to
maximize shareholder value and that antitrust law strives to protect “nonshareholder constituencies”);
Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 14
J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 16 (2001) (same).

First to Printer_Woodcock.docx (Do Not Delete)

1398

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

6/10/20 9:12 PM

[Vol. 10:1395

Almost from the start of the antitrust enterprise, however, scholars have
understood that no matter how hard antitrust enforcers work most markets can
never be made competitive enough to achieve antitrust law’s goal of low prices and
high consumer welfare.11 And yet the peculiar system of a corporate law that pushes
prices up and an antitrust law that tries to push them back down was never adjusted
to account for competition’s enduring shortcomings.12 The necessary adjustment is
to read the antitrust laws to impose an affirmative duty on management to minimize
profits, which would ensure that in those many markets in which competition does
not prevail, and there is nothing antitrust can do about it, firms will charge the
lowest possible prices consistent with maintaining efficient levels of quality and
output, at least if they wish to follow the law.13 I have proposed just such an
interpretation of antitrust law in another work and refer the reader to it for a defense
of its basis in law.14 In the present effort, I defend recognition of such a duty to
minimize profits in economic terms and explain how the duty fits into, and, as a
legal matter, would resolve, the debate over corporate mission.15
Recognition of a duty to minimize profits in corporate law would resolve the
legal question of corporate mission in favor neither of those who advocate that
profit be maximized for the benefit of shareholders nor, entirely, CSR, but in favor
of consumers.16 The rule requires that all of the firm’s profits be paid to consumers,
through either lower prices or better quality, and that no profits be left over either
for shareholders, managers, workers, or anyone else.17 Firms would be required to
earn zero profits.
If that prospect inspires fear and panic, that is probably because neither side
in the corporate mission debate has done a good job of clarifying what is at stake in
deciding the question of corporate mission.18 Profits are, by definition, the revenues
generated by firms that are in excess of what is necessary to make production in

11. See Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 1890–1955, 94
MINN. L. REV. 311, 320–21 (2009).
12. See Ramsi A. Woodcock, Inconsistency in Antitrust, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 105, 109–26 (2013)
(critiquing the failure to adjust).
13. See infra Section II.B.
14. Ramsi A. Woodcock, The Antitrust Duty to Charge Low Prices, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1741
(2018).
15. Two other attempts to connect antitrust and corporate governance highlight connections
between the fields but do not show how one may be brought under the control of the other, as I do
here. See Edward B. Rock, Corporate Law Through an Antitrust Lens, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 497, 501
(1992) (using the antitrust concept of collusion to consider the proper corporate governance approach
to takeover bids and other situations in which shareholders may also be competitors); Spencer Weber
Waller, Corporate Governance and Competition Policy, 18 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 833, 885 (2011) (arguing
that antitrust can help shareholders by more carefully screening mergers for genuine efficiency gains).
16. For the ways in which a duty to minimize profits diverges from CSR’s approach to
corporate governance, see infra Section II.E.
17. See infra Section II.B.
18. See infra Section I.B.
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some amount and of some quality take place.19 By definition, then, the profits over
which the shareholder primacy advocates and CSR have been fighting are not
compensation that is needed to get any contributor to the firm, whether a
shareholder, manager, worker, or creditor, to contribute what the firm needs to
produce. Profits are extra, and so no matter who takes them, production will
continue, shareholders and creditors will continue to invest, and managers and
workers will be paid the wages for which they or their union representatives have
bargained.20 The show will go on.21
The trouble with the corporate mission debate has been the confusion of the
problem of wealth distribution, which is what both sides are really interested in,
with the problem of efficiency: how to make the economy generate the largest
possible amount of wealth.22 Each side has tried to gain the advantage by appealing
to a norm both agree upon, that the economy should be made efficient, to support
each side’s preferred distributive outcome.23 The shareholder primacy camp tries to
avoid the distribution problem by arguing that unless firms are allowed to maximize
profits there will be insufficient reward for innovation, and the extraordinary era of
technological improvement that has so increased living standards over the past three
hundred years will come to an end.24 Thus the need for technological advance is
made to dictate the distribution of profits to shareholders alone. CSR, for its part,
has suggested that unless management can allocate profits on an ad hoc basis to
workers or reinvest profits in long-term projects, workers will not work hard
enough to maximize those profits, or the firm will perform poorly in the long run.25
Here, the need to encourage optimal firm performance is made to dictate the
distribution of profits to workers.
These arguments notwithstanding, the problem of how to distribute the
wealth generated by efficient production is always independent of the problem of
how to organize production efficiently and thereby to maximize the amount of

19. See Woodcock, supra note 12, at 127 n.56 (and sources cited therein); A. MITCHELL
POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 86–87 (1st ed. 1983) (observing that when
price equals cost, owners and managers of the firm still receive adequate compensation).
20. See infra Section I.C.
21. For limits on the ability to redistribute profits imposed by uniform pricing, see infra
Section II.D.
22. See EUGENE SILBERBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF ECONOMICS: A MATHEMATICAL
ANALYSIS 581 (2d ed. 1990) (defining efficiency).
23. See infra Section I.B.
24. An extraordinary expression of this view may be found in the work of Michael Jensen, the
dean of shareholder primacy in business schools, who has suggested that CSR consists of frustrated
partisans of failed “centrally planned socialist and communist economies” whose desire to “use
nonmarket forces to reallocate wealth” will “undermine the foundations of value-seeking behavior that
have enabled markets and capitalism to generate wealth and high standards of living worldwide.” Jensen,
supra note 10, at 21; see also STOUT, supra note 5, at 18–19 (discussing Jensen’s role in
shareholder primacy).
25. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 247, 271–76 (1999).
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wealth available for distribution.26 The arguments of both shareholder primacy
advocates and CSR have nothing to say about who should receive the firm’s profits,
whether shareholders, workers, or indeed consumers, because these arguments are
really about costs, meaning expenditures that are necessary for optimal economic
performance.27 Arguing that shareholders, workers, or anyone else must be paid the
firm’s profits because such payments are necessary to make the firm operate
efficiently does not actually address the problem of how to distribute the wealth
generated by the firm. If the payments really are necessary for the firm to operate
efficiently, then they are not payments from profits at all. They are costs. But profits
are by definition what is left over after all payments necessary to make a firm run
efficiently are paid. Once an efficient choice of which costs to incur has been made,
the fundamentally moral question always remains how to divide the wealth that has
been maximized by that choice. Neither shareholder primacy advocates nor CSR
has directly addressed this unavoidable question.
Happily, antitrust resolves the problem of distribution of profits as a matter
of law, relieving both shareholder primacy advocates and CSR of the burden of
having to step into the swamp of moral argument to establish that owners are more
deserving or workers more deserving, as the case may be.28 The courts already
implicitly decided that question in the 1970s, when they decided that consumer
welfare is the ultimate goal of antitrust.29 The consumer welfare standard requires
that, instead of reserving profits for shareholders or workers, the firm pay all of its
profits to consumers through lower prices or greater product quality.30
The notion that it is possible to have efficient management while still giving
profits to consumers seems to violate basic intuition regarding the importance of
providing an incentive to managers, or the shareholders who oversee them, to run
the firm efficiently. If profits are paid to consumers, who lack managerial control
over the firm, then managers or shareholders have no incentive to maximize the
firm’s profits. But this intuition is wrong. Inducing a firm to maximize profits does
not require that the firm be able to keep all of the profits it generates for itself.31
Because work incentives are tied to alternative employment opportunities, not

26. See infra Section I.C.
27. See infra Section I.C.
28. See infra Section II.B.
29. See Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard?
Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336, 347–48 (2010). As
Salop notes, the triumph of the consumer welfare standard was most clearly expressed by the Supreme
Court only in the 1990s, when the Court opined that failed predatory pricing is no antitrust concern
because, though the failure harms the firm, consumers benefit from the lower prices. See Brooke
Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993); Salop, supra, at 341.
30. To abide by a duty to minimize profits, a firm can either bring its prices down to its costs
or bring its costs up to its prices, by spending on improvements in product quality. Inflating costs
without delivering improvements in product quality would violate the duty, however, because inflated
costs are not true costs. Inflated costs are really profits that have been paid out to suppliers.
Cf. Woodcock, supra note 14, at 1776.
31. See infra Section I.C.2.a.
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productivity. Offer Steve Jobs a penny more than what he can earn in the next best
employment alternative available to him, and he will be ready and willing to run
Apple, regardless how much wealth he creates for others by doing so.32 In other
words, the yardstick for calculating the size of the incentive to engage in valuable
conduct is the value of the actor’s next best alternative, not the magnitude of the
value that the actor will create.33 Firms can put the interests of consumers first while
still retaining the incentive to produce efficiently.
Indeed, the existence of a shortfall between the size of the payments necessary
to create work incentives and the dollar value of a firm’s output explains why
economic growth is of any worth at all to society. If producers were only willing to
work in exchange for all of the fruits of their labor, then they would confer no gains
on others, because the world would have to return to them the entirety of what they
produce, leaving the world with no net benefit.34 Only because producers decide
what to produce based on alternatives, and not based on the value of what they
produce, are they willing to work for less than that value and their output capable
of improving the lives of others.
Under a rule requiring firms to minimize profits, a firm would be able to keep
for itself only so much as the firm needs to ensure that all of its contributors,
including shareholders, managers, workers, and suppliers, are made slightly better
off than they would be were they to do their next-best alternative jobs instead.35 But
no more. If there is any money left over after the contributors to production are
paid that amount, the firm would be required to reduce its prices.
But will the firm have any incentive not only to operate efficiently in the short
run but also to invest in improving its products in the long run, if any additional
profits the firm generates from improvements must be left to consumers? The
answer is again yes. The extra incentive required to induce a firm to improve a
product is cost, not profit, since the incentive is necessary for efficient production,
in the sense of long-term efficiency, to take place.36 As a result, under a rule
requiring minimization of profits, the firm would be allowed to retain such extra
incentives for itself and would not be required to pay them out to consumers. But
the amount of such incentives would be very small. So long as the firm retains any
constant percentage, no matter how small, of the value of any improvements that
the firm confers on consumers, the firm will be better off executing the

32. See E. Earl Burch & William R. Henry, Opportunity and Incremental Cost: Attempt to Define
in Systems Terms: A Comment, 49 ACCT. REV. 118, 119 (1974).
33. See id.
34. This point is often made in the context of markets subject to first-degree price
discrimination, in which a monopolist charges each consumer a price equal to precisely the value that
the consumer places on the product, allowing the seller to extract from consumers as a group the entire
value that those consumers place on the product. See DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 306 (1990). If all markets are subject to this kind of value extraction, then
a fortiori the economy as a whole confers no net gain on consumers.
35. See infra Section II.B.
36. See infra Section I.C.
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improvement than it would be doing nothing, and so the firm will have all the
incentive it needs to act.37
As I discuss in my other paper, the duty to minimize profits should be
enforceable only by nominal damages, to avoid putting judges in the difficult
position of making pricing decisions for firms.38 Enforcement by nominal damages
alone would also ensure that mistakes by judges in determining exactly what counts
as costs will not force firms out of business or into underperformance, because
firms could simply pay a dollar and carry on if they disagree with the judgment.39
The absence of a stronger sanction does not, however, mean that the rule would
have no force, because people often strive to comply with rules out of a belief in
the importance of following the law.40 Public opinion, which would take note of
any judgment of a federal court that profits are too high, would enforce the rule
as well.41
Treating the corporate mission debate as a duel over the distribution of the
surplus generated by corporations in excess of costs is an exercise in rent theory
economics.42 Rent theory is not so much a separate branch of economics as a
perspective on economics that emphasizes the effect of laws on the distribution of
wealth at the level of the market, rather than at the level of the economy as a whole.43
Rent theory was popular in the first half of the 20th century, but fell out of favor
thereafter as policymakers started hoping to solve all problems of wealth
distribution through economy-wide taxation, instead of by using the law to alter the

37. This is true if firms can be relied upon actually to take only their costs plus a small
percentage of the value they create from consumers. If firms cannot be relied upon to do that, and
some outside enforcer must monitor their behavior, then problems arise. The subfield of economics
devoted to the principal-agent problem considers how incentives can be designed to induce an agent,
here, the firm, to maximize the wealth of a principal, here consumers, when the principal cannot
observe with precision the costs incurred by the agent. See MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 9, at
477–79. In such cases, more complicated incentive schemes than conferral of a mere percentage of the
profit may be necessary to maximize the principal’s wealth, and the maximum levels of wealth actually
created may still be lower than what could be achieved were the agent simply to be allowed to keep all
of the wealth that the agent generates. See id. at 487. The profit-minimization duty discussed in the
present Article would not involve the use of hard sanctions, and so the monitoring problem does not
come into play here. See Woodcock, supra note 14, at 1747, 1771. Firms do the right thing and give
themselves the right, minimal incentives. See JOSEPH NEEDHAM, THE GRAND TITRATION: SCIENCE
AND SOCIETY IN EAST AND WEST 312 (1969) (“Confucius . . . said that if the people were given laws
and levelled by punishments, they would try to avoid the punishments but have no sense of shame; but
that if they were ‘led by virtue’ they would spontaneously avoid disputes and crimes.”). Or they do not.
For a discussion of the principal-agent problem and corporate governance, see infra Section I.C.2.a.
38. Woodcock, supra note 14, at 1747, 1775–76.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1772.
41. Id.
42. See BARBARA FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE
AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 145–49 (1998).
43. See id. at 150–53 (contrasting policies designed to alter the relative bargaining power of
market participants, which were favored by rent theorists such as Robert Hale, with “broad scale”
taxation as means of redistributing wealth).
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structure of individual markets to achieve desired distributive outcomes.44 Rent
theory is well suited to the corporate mission debate because that debate is about
how the firms that make up markets should behave.45
I show first that economic efficiency does not require that firms keep the
profits that they generate for themselves, as opposed to giving their profits to
consumers by charging them lower prices.46 I then show that once the influence of
CSR is taken into account, corporate law today permits, but does not require, firms
to minimize their profits for the benefit of consumers.47 I then read antitrust law
to require that firms minimize profits.48 I show that such an antitrust-based duty of
firms to charge prices no higher than their production costs preempts state
corporate law.49 I next consider some inefficiencies created by the use of antitrust’s
consumer welfare standard in particular as the basis for a profit-minimization duty
and I propose changes to the consumer welfare standard that would eliminate those
inefficiencies.50 Finally, I argue that although a profit-minimization rule would not
achieve CSR’s distributive goals, such a rule would do some social justice.51
I. DISTRIBUTION AND EFFICIENCY IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
ANTITRUST
A. Profit Maximization as a Distributive Problem
Shareholder primacy is about the distribution of wealth. It provides that a firm
should appropriate as profits the entirety of the surplus—defined as the margin
between the costs of producing a product and the value that consumers place upon
the product—that the firm generates, and then turn all of that surplus over to
shareholders.52 CSR’s attacks on shareholder primacy are also distributive, in that
through those attacks CSR seeks to create legal space for the allocation of surplus
to other groups, such as workers.53

44. See id. at 200.
45. See id. at 152.
46. See infra Part I.
47. See infra Part II.A.
48. See infra Section II.B.
49. See infra Section II.C.
50. See infra Section II.D.
51. See infra Sections II.E.
52. See Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2066–67 (2001) (treating the “shareholder wealth maximization norm” as
mandating maximization of the firm’s profits for the benefit of shareholders). For discussions of the
nature of surplus, see infra notes 59, 158.
53. See Elhauge, supra note 5, at 745–46 (arguing that the “obligation to make profits is not and
should not be exclusive, but that instead managers do and should have some limited discretion to
temper it in order to comply with social and moral norms”); Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of
Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2003, 2005–06 (2013) (discussing the relationship between
shareholder primacy and the Chicago School).
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Both shareholder primacy advocates and CSR are only half aware of the
distributive character of the debate. In their more sober moments, both
acknowledge that the question whether shareholders, managers, workers, or some
other group should enjoy the profits generated by the firm is distributive.54 But
neither shareholder primacy advocates nor CSR seems to realize that the other part
of shareholder primacy, the notion that firms should maximize profits in addition
to giving profits to shareholders, is itself distributive in nature. But of course it is,
because profits come from consumers and the maximization of profits implies the
minimization of the share of the surplus generated by production that consumers
can keep for themselves.55 Most corporate law scholars today, of whatever stripe,
tend to treat profits as though they were manna from heaven, and quibble only over
which group of firm insiders, whether shareholders, managers, or workers, should
take that manna. For them, profit maximization, at least in the long term, is an
unambiguous good, rather than what it really is, the redistribution of wealth from
consumers to firms.56 Both sides act as if firms operate not in a market economy
54. See Paddy Ireland, Shareholder Primacy and the Distribution of Wealth, 68 MOD. L. REV. 49,
70 (2005) (“[T]he growth in shareholder power is best seen as one aspect of the more general shift in
the last thirty or so years in the balance of class forces around the world.”); Jensen, supra note 10, at 13
(recognizing that the problem of corporate mission is the problem “how to choose among multiple
constituencies with competing and, in some cases, conflicting interests”); Brian E. Becker, Concession
Bargaining: The Impact on Shareholders’ Equity, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 268, 268 (1987). For the
failed attempts to transform this distributive question into an efficiency question, see infra Sections
I.B, I.C.
55. Most discussions of corporate mission tend not even to distinguish between the
profit-allocation and profit-maximization aspects of shareholder primacy. See Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657, 661 (1996) (advocating a
“shareholder wealth maximization norm”); STOUT, supra note 5, at 32 (rejecting the requirement of
“maximizing shareholder value”).
56. Michael Jensen, for example, argues that: “Value maximization (or value seeking) provides
the following answer to the [distributive] question: Spend an additional dollar on any constituency
provided the long-term value added to the firm from such expenditure is a dollar or more.” Jensen,
supra note 10, at 14. With its reference to the “long-term value added to the firm” this formulation
amounts to a call for profit maximization, as opposed to maximization of the overall surplus generated
by the firm. Id. (emphasis added). And yet in his use of the label “value maximization” for what he is
describing, not to mention in statements he makes elsewhere in his article, Jensen makes clear that by
value maximization he means (total) surplus maximization. See id. at 13–14. Profit maximization and
surplus maximization are identical, of course, only if one forgets that both consumers and firms can
share the surplus, and so profits can be increased by redistributing surplus from consumers to firms
rather than by increasing the overall size of the surplus. Jensen’s failure here to recognize the distributive
consequences of profit maximization is all the more surprising in that elsewhere in the same article he
does acknowledge that consumers are stakeholders in the firm and want “low prices [and] high
quality . . . .” See id. at 13.
Consider a second example. Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout argue that their approach to corporate
governance “ultimately serves [the] interests [of shareholders] as a class, as well as those of the other
members of the corporate coalition.” Blair & Stout, supra note 25, at 305. Although Blair and Stout do
mention consumers a couple of times in their article, it is clear that by “corporate coalition” they mean
to include “shareholders, employees, and perhaps other stakeholders such as creditors or the local
community,” but not consumers. See id. at 278. For them, a more equal distribution of surplus among
these groups increases the value of the firm—meaning profits—and that can potentially make them all
better off. But there is no acknowledgment that this is possible only if the firm extracts the additional
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in which their wealth is derived always from a negotiation with consumers, but in a
prehistoric economy in which the firm produces for itself alone, extracting game
and berries from the land exclusively for its own consumption.57 In that world,
profit comes from no one.58 But not in our world.59 Consumers have always been
claimants in the corporate mission debate, alongside workers, managers, and
shareholders, among others, albeit largely silent ones because neither side has taken
up their case.
The Chicago School, which has long been an important source of shareholder
primacy advocacy, seems nevertheless to have grasped the distributive nature of
profit maximization, however subconsciously, in deciding to lay siege not just to
corporate governance, but also to antitrust. The Chicago School seems to have
understood that corporate law can be used to induce firms to attempt to maximize
profits, but, in order for firms actually to succeed at maximizing profits, antitrust
law must be made to desist from using competition to drive prices, and hence
profits, down.60 The Chicago School therefore argued against vigorous
enforcement of the antitrust laws and in favor of allowing firms to charge high
prices and thereby to seize the greatest possible share of surplus from consumers.61

value created by the firm from consumers. For more on these scholars’ view that a more equal
distribution of surplus increases surplus by facilitating “team production,” see infra Section I.C.2.b.
57. In such an economy, the value of goods is determined by the producer, rather than by
independent consumers, because only the producer enjoys the fruits of the producer’s efforts. See
ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 684 (8th ed. 1920) (“[I]n estimating the weal and
woe in the life of a Robinson Crusoe, it would be simplest to reckon his producer’s surplus on such a
plan as to include the whole of his consumer’s surplus.”). Consequently, the producer can increase
profits only by producing better goods, upon which the producer places a greater value, and profit
maximization therefore has no distributive consequences.
58. See id.
59. In economic terms, the total amount of wealth that a firm can transfer from consumers to
itself is the total dollar value that consumers place on the firm’s products, that is, consumers’ total
willingness to pay for those products, less the firm’s costs of production, which consumers must cover
in order to induce the firm to produce. See MARSHALL, supra note 57, at 103, 668–69 n.1. By choosing
prices, firms decide how much of that surplus of value over cost to distribute to themselves and how
much to leave for consumers. See id. at 668–69 n.1. From this perspective, the question whether the
firm should maximize profits is fundamentally distributive: it is the question whether firms should be
allowed to take the entirety of the surplus they generate for themselves—which is what happens when
profits are fully maximized—or consumers should be allowed to keep some of the surplus.
Of course, firms often fail to maximize profits, even when they try, in which case profit
maximization may not spell total redistribution of surplus from consumers to firms. See W. KIP VISCUSI
ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 71–73 (5th ed. 2018) (giving a simple example
of uniform monopoly pricing in which consumers retain a share of the surplus). But that technological
limitation does not make profit maximization any less a project of minimizing the access of consumers
to the surplus generated by firms. See infra Section II.D.
60. See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 409 (7th
ed. 2006) (“In an industry with free entry, profits will be driven to zero by new entrants: whenever
profits are positive, there will be an incentive for a new firm to come in to acquire some of those
profits.”).
61. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 7–8,
111 (2d ed. 1993) (decrying the then-current view that “no business structure . . . has any potential for
social good” and arguing that so long as business conduct increases surplus it should not be challenged,
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CSR, by contrast, seems never to have been troubled by the distributive implications
of profit maximization.62 CSR has never challenged the profit-maximization norm,
at least as it relates to the long run.63 Perhaps as a result, CSR has failed even to try
even if the conduct reduces consumers’ share of the surplus); Stout, supra note 53, at 2005–06
(discussing the Chicago School and shareholder primacy).
62. Einer Elhauge, for example, does not mention the consumer interest anywhere in his
166-page rejection of shareholder primacy in corporate law, even though Elhauge also writes in antitrust
and in that realm advocates greater protection for consumers. See Elhauge, supra note 5 (rejecting
shareholder primacy without mentioning consumers); Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the
Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 435–39 (2009) (arguing that
antitrust’s mission is to protect consumers). Consumers do play a role in Elhauge’s rejection of
shareholder primacy, but only as citizens troubled by clear-cutting of forests and the like. See Elhauge,
supra note 5, at 750.
Indeed, consumers appear in almost every possible guise in CSR except in their role as claimants
on firm wealth. In listing beneficiaries to which corporations are free to distribute their wealth, Lynn
Stout mentions charities, employees, creditors, communities, and the environment, but not consumers.
She does observe that firms that “take care” of consumers maximize long-run profits for the firm, but
does not seem to realize that profit maximization, even in the long run, is a zero-sum game played
between consumers and firms. STOUT, supra note 5, at 69. Taking care of consumers in order to
maximize long-run profits, which profits must ultimately be extracted from consumers, means
fattening the calf. See infra Section I.C.2.b.
Similarly unaware of the interest of consumers in reducing firm profits, the American Law
Institute sees the duty of the board to consumers as extending only to product safety, and makes no
mention of the problem of high prices. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01
cmt. h. (Am. Law Inst., 1994). Edward Freeman mentions that consumers “exchange resources” with
firms, but goes on to suggest that the major interest of consumers is in having firms keep promises to
them made through advertising. See FREEMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 25. One of the few CSR scholars
who acknowledges the consumer interest in firm profits, albeit in passing, is Daniel J.H. Greenwood,
The Dividend Puzzle: Are Shares Entitled to the Residual?, 32 J. CORP. L. 103, 113–14, 114 n.28 (2006)
(arguing that a firm can pay its profits out as “discounts to customers”). Interestingly, the economic
interest of consumers in the firm is more explicit in works advocating shareholder primacy. See Jensen,
supra note 10, at 13. But even there it remains submerged. See sources cited supra note 56.
63. CSR’s attacks on profit maximization are usually really arguments regarding how profits
should be allocated, rather than arguments against maximizing profits. CSR argues, for example, that
rather than maximize profits, firms should pay workers higher wages. See Elhauge, supra note 5, at 845
(approving of a rule that would allow “sacrifice . . . of . . . profits” by a firm in the form of keeping
unneeded workers employed). But that is really an argument that firms should share more of their
profits with workers, by paying workers higher wages. It is not an argument that firms should not strive
to charge the highest possible prices to consumers, and extract the largest profits from consumers, only
an argument that once the greatest possible profits have been taken from consumers, the profits should
be shared with workers.
Other CSR attacks on profit maximization are not directed at profit maximization’s effects on
consumers, but rather at the use of maximization by firms as a rule of decision regarding how to act.
According to this position, because society seeks to achieve multiple goals through regulation of
corporate behavior, such as improving the welfare of both workers and consumers, there is no one
thing for a firm to maximize, whether profits, surplus more generally, or anything else. See FREEMAN
ET AL., supra note 5, at 13. According to this objection, firm behavior should be governed by a balancing
of interests, or some other approach to decision-making, instead of by the maximization of the welfare
of one particular group. See id. at 28.
This objection misses that society can only ever have one preferred outcome, which is the
maximal outcome, regardless how many competing considerations may go into its selection. See Jensen,
supra note 10, at 10. Society might have one goal for a firm, ten goals, or a hundred, but at any given
time the firm can only do one set of things. See id. The set might include trying to save the forests by
reducing paper usage and trying to help workers by increasing wages. But the firm cannot both reduce
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to block the Chicago School’s attacks on the antitrust laws, allowing the Chicago
School to dominate antirust for a time in a way that the school, and shareholder
primacy advocacy more generally, never quite could dominate corporate law.64

paper usage and increase wages and increase paper usage and decrease wages at the same time. In order
to choose the unique set of actions that the firm will follow, the firm must rank the sets, and
maximization means only that the firm should select the particular set of actions that the firm, or the
society that governs the firm, prefers the most.
Edward Freeman, for example, rejects shareholder wealth maximization on the ground that firms
do better when they avoid seeing their role as choosing between the competing interests of firm
stakeholders, but instead strive to make all stakeholders better off. See FREEMAN ET AL., supra note 5,
at 28. But that choice, to make all stakeholders better off, is just the result of choosing the
highest-ranked business plan from a set of plans in which making all stakeholders better off is ranked
the highest. That is, Freeman is maximizing, but over a ranking that places equitable distribution of
firm wealth higher in the ranking than the distribution of all firm wealth to shareholders. Freeman’s
quibble is not with maximization itself, but with the ranking over which maximization is conducted.
Profit may not be the proper quantity to maximize, but if firms are to act, then firms must choose
how to act, and choice implies maximization based upon some preference ordering. This Article argues
that the antitrust laws require that firms maximize consumer welfare, meaning that actions by firms
that make consumers better off should be ranked higher than actions that make consumers worse off,
and that firms choose the best action according to that ranking. See infra Section II.B.
64. In antitrust law, for example, state legislatures did not fight back against the Chicago School
approach, as they did in corporate law, when dozens of states adopted anti-takeover legislation designed
to weaken shareholder primacy. See Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Missing the Point About State
Takeover Statutes, 87 MICH. L. REV. 846, 846, 848 (1989) (“to protect non shareholders from the
disruptive impact of the corporate restructurings that are thought typically to result from hostile
takeovers”). And CSR dissent against shareholder primacy has been a constant presence since at least
the 1980s. See, e.g., David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1375–76 (1993); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-so-Bad Arguments for
Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1203–04 (2002); Elhauge, supra note 5, at 830–40.
By contrast, until very recently, no antitrust scholar was willing to call for a return to the vigorous
antitrust enforcement policies that predated the Chicago revolution in antitrust. Indeed, the first law
review article of recent decades, of which I am aware, to advocate a wholesale return to the old approach
to antitrust is Sandeep Vaheesan, Resurrecting a “Comprehensive Charter of Economic Liberty”: The Latent
Power of the Federal Trade Commission, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 645, 673–90 (2017). Resistance to the
Chicago School in antitrust has historically been much more compromising, a position summed up by
the title of an influential collection of resistance writings: “How the Chicago School Overshot the
Mark.” HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008). For example, one member of
this more modest antitrust resistance advocates greater antitrust enforcement today, but also accepts
that pre-Chicago-School antitrust enforcement was excessive. See Jonathan B. Baker, Evaluating
Appropriability Defenses for the Exclusionary Conduct of Dominant Firms in Innovative Industries, 80
ANTITRUST L.J. 431, 455–56 (2016); Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error Out of Error Cost
Analysis: What’s Wrong with Antitrust’s Right, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 1 (2015). As a result, while
corporate law has continued to permit such manifestly shareholder-unfriendly conduct as the making
of donations to charity, antitrust enforcement, and the limits on profit maximization that enforcement
implies, fell off a cliff starting in the 1980s and has not recovered. See Elhauge, supra note 5, at 830–40
(discussing the law of corporate donations); Ramsi A. Woodcock, The Hidden Rules of a Modest
Antitrust, 105 MINN. L. REV. (2021) (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 28–38) (surveying
Chicago-School-driven antitrust rule and enforcement changes); Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of
Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 827, 830 (2009) (showing
that nearly all cases decided by case-by-case analysis fail); JOHN E. KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER
CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY 158 (2015) (concluding
that “significantly more” anticompetitive mergers have been approved as a result of the policy change).
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Fortunately for consumers, however, some in antitrust did resist the Chicago
School’s attempts to kill antitrust by establishing the rule that a firm may extract as
much profit as possible from consumers.65
The Chicago School’s response to this resistance gave rise to the consumer
welfare standard followed by antitrust today, a development that will loom large in
Part II. In response to the resistance, the Chicago School pressed the argument that
large rewards for firms today may be necessary to induce firms to create products
that confer even higher rewards on consumers tomorrow.66 This allowed the
Chicago School to use the possibility of offsetting consumer gains in some vague
and distant future to justify profit maximization today.67 But this strategic gambit,
and its acceptance into mainstream antitrust, also introduced into the antitrust laws
for the first time the notion that the ultimate goal of the laws is to help consumers,
not firms.68
In triggering the creation of the consumer welfare standard in antitrust, the
Chicago School inadvertently laid the groundwork for the demise of the entire
shareholder primacy norm, both the part dedicated to profit maximization and the
part dedicated to the allocation of profit to shareholders. For the consumer welfare
standard enshrines the maximization of consumer surplus as the goal of the antitrust
laws.69 That was a major departure from earlier approaches to antitrust, which

65. See, e.g., Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future of American Antitrust Policy
Symposium: Anticipating Antitrusts Centennial, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 797, 800–801 (1987) (arguing that
“economic analysis problems do not warrant a severe retrenchment in the scope of antitrust law”).
66. See Ramsi A. Woodcock, Personalized Pricing and the Return of Wealth Redistribution at the
Market Level (2019) (unpublished manuscript). Probably the most famous statement of this position is
Justice Scalia’s: “The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what
attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and
economic growth.” See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004). The implication of the qualifier that the monopoly prices will be charged only “for a short
period” is that consumers will benefit from the innovation after that period ends. To be sure, the
Chicago School has simultaneously continued to press for the rule that antitrust should not care whether
the surplus goes to firms or consumers. See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Judge Bork, Consumer Welfare, and
Antitrust Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 449, 453–54 (2008) (arguing that the courts have actually
rejected the consumer welfare standard in favor of the Chicago School’s proposed “total
welfare standard”).
67. See BORK, supra note 61, at 396; Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63
TEX. L. REV. 1, 15 (1984) (arguing that antitrust should err “on the side of excusing questionable
practices” because they are likely ultimately to benefit consumers); David J. Teece & Mary Coleman,
The Meaning of Monopoly: Antitrust Analysis in High-Technology Industries, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 801,
819–22 (1998) (arguing that monopoly profits are “generally necessary to induce investment in the
creation of . . . knowledge assets”).
68. See Salop, supra note 29, at 336–37; John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental
Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191,
192–93 (2008); John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Chicago School’s Foundation Is
Flawed: Antitrust Protects Consumers, Not Efficiency, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE
MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 89, 90 (Robert
Pitofsky ed., 2008); Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 68–69 (1982).
69. See infra note 210.
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focused on the pursuit of competition for its own sake.70 The consumer welfare
standard, by contrast, extends far beyond that, to require that firms charge not
competitive prices, but the lowest possible prices.71 The standard requires, in short,
that all of the surplus generated by firms be given to consumers alone, as will
become clear in Part II. This explosive principle has so far remained bottled within
antitrust by the narrowness of antitrust remedies, which for the most part extend to
promoting competition, rather than dictating prices.72 But, as I show elsewhere, that
can be made to change.73
B. The Appeal of Efficiency
If shareholder primacy is a distributive doctrine, deciding both how surplus is
allocated between firm insiders and—in conjunction with antitrust—how it is
allocated between firms and consumers, and CSR, as antagonist of shareholder
primacy, is equally concerned with distributive outcomes, then why do both sides
debate corporate mission in the language of efficiency, rather than distribution?74
Why does the Chicago School argue, for example, that shareholders should take all
of the surplus firms generate because that will give shareholders an incentive to
compel managers to run the firm efficiently?75 And why does CSR counter that
workers should be given part of the surplus because that will induce workers to
labor efficiently?76 The answer is that the two sides argue that their own preferred
distributions of surplus are necessary for efficient production to take place in order
to achieve rhetorical advantage in the debate over the mission of the firm. But any
advantage they do obtain is, alas, of dubious long-term use.
Efficiency, understood to mean production that results in the largest possible
surplus, is a superficially appealing crutch for distributive arguments because both
sides tend to agree that maximizing the size of the surplus is a good thing, and that
makes efficiency a neutral rule of decision.77 No other rule that might be applied to
70. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (“The Sherman Act was
designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered
competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive
forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and
the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the
preservation of our democratic political and social institutions. But even were that premise open to
question, the policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition.”).
71. See infra Section II.D.
72. See Woodcock, supra note 14, at 1755–58.
73. See id. at 1760–72.
74. For examples, see infra Section I.C.
75. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395,
403 (1983) (giving the “residual” to shareholders maximizes firm value); Jensen, supra note 10, at
10–11 (maximizing firm value maximizes social welfare). This argument is discussed at length infra in
Section I.C.2.a.
76. See Blair & Stout, supra note 25, at 319–23. This argument is discussed at length infra in
Section I.C.2.b.
77. See Jensen, supra note 10, at 11–12; Elhauge, supra note 5, at 735–38 (arguing that corporate
law would not prevent firms from sacrificing profits to prevent the externalities associated with
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determine who should take the surplus attracts the same consensus.78 Some believe
that surplus should be distributed based on the principle of equality.79 Others that
surplus should be distributed unequally based on the principle of talent.80 Others
believe that surplus should be distributed based on effort or wisdom.81 And so on.
But both shareholder primacy advocates and CSR seem to agree that, if the answer
to the technical question how to maximize surplus turns out to be that the entire
surplus must be turned over to a particular group, then that group should take it,
because both sides agree on the desirability of efficiency.82
Except that they likely both do not. Despite the focus of both sides on
efficiency as a rule of decision, efficiency’s power to settle the distributive question
has always been limited. For at the end of the day, it is difficult to imagine that
anyone committed in the first instance to a particular distributive outcome, with all
of the moral fervor that entails, would be willing to sacrifice that outcome for cold,
technical, efficiency.83 If the Chicago School were to succeed at proving that surplus
can only be maximized by turning it over, in its entirety, to shareholders, CSR would
not simply concede the field.84 CSR would fall back on the argument that justice
demands that workers, managers, suppliers, and others obtain a fair share of surplus,
even if that means reducing the overall amount of surplus generated.85 The
clear-cutting a forest); Werner Hediger, Welfare and Capital-Theoretic Foundations of Corporate Social
Responsibility and Corporate Sustainability, 39 J. SOCIO-ECON. 518, 521 (2010).
78. See WILLIAM BAUMOL, SUPERFAIRNESS: APPLICATIONS AND THEORY 4 (1986) (“[W]e
have of course no agreement upon what decisions deserve to be considered just.”). Which makes
distributive debates “political.” See James R. Hackney, Jr., Law and Neoclassical Economics Theory: A
Critical History of the Distribution/Efficiency Debate, 32 J. SOCIO-ECON. 361, 362 (2003).
79. See Greenwood, supra note 62, at 115 (“[A]s a general rule, no one has a moral entitlement
to rents.”).
80. Cf. Harold Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy, 16 J.L. & ECON. 1,
3 (1973) (arguing against antitrust enforcement against large firms because large firms’ power may be
due to “superior ability”).
81. See 2 THOMAS ROBERT MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION
368–72 (1826) (arguing that the “idle and improvident” should be the last to receive charity).
82. That would explain why both shareholder value advocates and CSR appeal to efficiency to
defend their positions. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization
Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1446–47 (1993); Blair & Stout, supra
note 25, at 322; Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About Shareholder Primacy, 31
DEL. J. CORP. L. 533, 538–39 (2006).
83. It is for this reason that economists recognize that there is no guarantee that any two persons
bargaining over the distribution of gains from trade will ever reach agreement. Each may hold out
interminably for a better deal, with the result that trade may never happen and the gains may never be
realized. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 92 (6th ed. 2012); POLINSKY,
supra note 19, at 18. Mark Blaug observes that “most decisions of public policy . . . are expressly
designed to aid a favoured group at the expense of every other . . . .” MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC
THEORY IN RETROSPECT 608 (4th ed. 1985).
84. See BAUMOL, supra note 78, at 131 (observing that “even though everyone shares in them,
the distribution of benefits may be unfair”).
85. The antitrust laws themselves exhibit a willingness to sacrifice efficiency for redistributive
ends. That is the content of the consumer welfare standard employed by antitrust law, which requires
that antitrust maximize consumer surplus, even if doing so would reduce surplus overall. See 1 PHILLIP
E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, 153 (4th ed. 2013). That standard may be
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maximization of surplus is meaningless for managers, workers, or suppliers, CSR
would argue, if these people can enjoy no part of the surplus.86 By the same token,
the Chicago School would argue, against irrefutable proof that shareholder primacy
leads to inefficient operation of the firm, that shareholders still deserve to have it
all, even if that reduces efficiency.87 The investors who make production possible,
they would argue, deserve the fruits as a matter of justice, if not as a requirement of
efficiency. The battle over efficiency has always been a proxy battle the salience of
which to the broader war over distribution is uncertain at best.
Some scholars seek to rationalize the appeal to efficiency using the logic of
cooperative game theory, in which opposing parties agree to act in ways that expand
the surplus generated by markets in exchange for a share of the gains.88 The idea
here is that by agreeing to split the gains from cooperation, the parties both end up
better off, in absolute terms, than they would going it alone.89 In the corporate
mission context, that means that the Chicago School and CSR are right to argue
over efficiency, because if they can identify and implement an efficient corporate
governance structure, they can then divide the resulting increase in surplus between
shareholders and groups favored by CSR, such as workers, leaving all groups
better off.
The trouble with this bargaining theory of appeals to efficiency is that in
practice neither side appeals to efficiency in order to offer a division of the
additional surplus that efficiency may generate. Both sides appeal to efficiency in
order to establish an iron tie between efficiency and a preferred division of

understood to reflect a bargained-for concession to consumers as an interest group. See Jonathan
B. Baker, Competition Policy as a Political Bargain, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 483, 515–22 (2006). For another
example of a rejection of efficiency on distributive grounds, see David Millon, New Game Plan or
Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001,
1005 (2000).
86. This point is of the same general kind as the argument that perfect price discrimination
renders consumption of no use to consumers. See Wassily Leontief, The Pure Theory of the Guaranteed
Annual Wage Contract, 54 J. POL. ECON. 76, 79 (1946) (observing that a perfectly price discriminating
firm, which extracts the entirety of the surplus from its counterparty, leaves its counterparty “clinging
as closely as possible” to that party’s “indifference line”). For more in this vein, see infra Section I.C.2.a.
87. Consider, for example, the peculiar argument made by David J. Teece and Mary Coleman,
that Ricardian and Schumpeterian economic rents, which they acknowledge result from “price . . . being
above cost,” are nevertheless “necessary to induce investment.” See Teece & Coleman, supra note 67, at
819–20, 822. Anything earned above cost, in the economic sense in which Teece and Coleman use the
word, is by definition not required to cover costs, including those costs of research and development
called “investments.” See infra Section I.C. Behind this almost Freudian slippage between rents and costs
one senses a belief that whatever a firm does earn the firm must somehow deserve.
88. See Jonathan B. Baker, Economics and Politics: Perspectives on the Goals and Future of
Antitrust, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2175, 2180–86 (2013); Baker, supra note 85, at 485–93. Advocates of
the use of tax and transfer, as opposed to the changing of legal rules, to redistribute wealth effectively
take this approach. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 654–55
(2004). Tax and transfer advocates argue that legal rules should be chosen for efficiency, and that the
tax system should be used to redistribute the gains associated with efficiency to ensure that all groups
share in those gains. See id.
89. See Baker, supra note 85, at 485–93.
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surplus.90 Shareholder primacy advocates argue, for example, that giving the entirety
of the surplus generated by firms to shareholders is necessary to maximize surplus.91
There is no room in their argument for a sharing of gains from efficient
organization of production.92 By the same token, CSR argues that spreading surplus
among workers and managers is the only way to maximize surplus.93 Any gains that
result must therefore be divided according to the same plan. The distribution of
gains is predetermined and cannot be shared as an inducement to others to approve
this particular proposed bargain. Indeed, the trouble with the bargain theory is that
it assumes that surplus can be redistributed freely once it has been maximized, which
means that the theory concedes from the start that the distributive question is
independent of the efficiency problem.94 That puts the parties to the corporate
mission debate back where they started: haggling over who gets what. But the parties
to the corporate mission debate appeal to efficiency instead for authority that their
preferred distribution is required for efficiency.95
C. Cost Confusion
Even if the two sides of the corporate mission debate were willing to let
efficiency decide the distributive question, the structure of any efficiency-based
argument for a particular distribution of surplus must rest on a category mistake,
making all such arguments incapable of deciding the distributive question.96 All
efficiency-based arguments must claim that giving surplus to one group or another
is necessary to induce that group to take steps that maximize the size of the
surplus.97 But payments required to induce efficient production do not count as
distributions of surplus at all, but rather as payments of the costs of production,

90. See Blair & Stout, supra note 25, at 327–28; Anant K. Sundaram & Andrew C. Inkpen, The
Corporate Objective Revisited, 15 ORG. SCI. 350, 354 (2004).
91. Examples may be found in Section I.C.2.a.
92. To be sure, shareholder primacy advocates sometimes argue by implication that the
efficiency gains associated with shareholder primacy raise all boats. See Lee, supra note 82, at 538 n.7.
But these advocates can mean only that other groups benefit marginally from the efficiency of
shareholder primacy. Giving a substantial portion of the surplus to other groups would conflict with
shareholder primacy advocates’ basic argument, which is that giving substantially all of the surplus
generated by a firm to shareholders alone leads to efficient operation of the firm.
93. See Blair & Stout, supra note 25, at 305. Like defenders of shareholder primacy, CSR
sometimes argues that the efficiency gains associated with shareholder primacy raise all boats. See id.
But here again the argument can only be that other groups (here shareholders) benefit marginally. See
supra note 92.
94. See Baker, supra note 85, at 491 (“[T]he two diffuse interest groups can bargain to achieve a
regulatory regime in which antitrust enforcement ensures competition among firms. The efficiency
gains from competition would then be split between producers and consumers.”).
95. See supra notes 92–93. Examples of these arguments may be found in Section I.C.2.
96. See Andrew Chin, Ghost in the New Machine: How Alice Exposed Software Patenting’s
Category Mistake, 16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 623, 628 (2015) (“A category mistake occurs when an entity is
placed in the wrong category or is given an attribute that only entities in another category can have.”).
97. That is because efficient operation of the firm maximizes the surplus generated by the firm.
See Jensen, supra note 10, at 11–12.
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since they are necessary for efficient production to take place.98 As a result, these
arguments fail in the end to have any implications for the proper distribution of
surplus. They say nothing about how to distribute the wealth left over after costs
are covered.
1. In Antitrust Debates
a. Fixed Costs
Consider, for example, the basic argument of the Chicago School for reducing
antitrust enforcement and allowing firms to maximize their profits.99 The Chicago
School argues that firms must be allowed to maximize profits in order to pay the
fixed costs that are necessary to induce entrepreneurs, investors, and engineers,
among others, to contribute to the firm in ways that are efficient.100 Unlike, say, the
cost of packaging materials, fixed costs are not associated with any particular unit
of output.101 They are usually incurred before production begins at all, and so they
can easily be forgotten when summing up the total costs of a venture and
determining the profitability of a firm.102 When fixed costs are not included in the
calculation of profits, the Chicago School argues, a firm may appear to be
appropriating a large share of the surplus generated by production for itself, but in
fact the firm’s high prices, and the apparently large profits that result, are needed
to cover the costs of entrepreneurship, investment, and innovation that make the
venture possible.103 It follows, argues the Chicago School, that antitrust enforcers
should not strive to drive down prices and profits.
The story the Chicago School tells about fixed costs is largely true. But it does
not add up to an argument that firms should be permitted to appropriate the
entirety of the surplus they generate in the form of profits. Because whatever
surplus a firm must appropriate to cover fixed costs does not really count as surplus
at all, but rather as costs. Fixed costs are costs, not surplus. They are necessary to
allow the firm to maximize surplus, which is to say, necessary for the efficient

98. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 593 (4th
ed. 1977).
99. See Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Innovation and the Limits of Antitrust, 6
J. COMPETITION L. ECON. 153, 196–97 (2010); Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis
V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004).
100. See Manne & Wright, supra note 99, at 196–97. For a discussion of the economics of fixed
costs and innovation, see F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 622–24 (3d ed. 1990).
101. SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 100, at 622–24.
102. Id.
103. See Manne & Wright, supra note 99, at 171–72; SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 100, at
622–24. According to this argument, the surplus is also necessary to insure against volatility in the firm’s
revenue stream. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY
89–90 (1976).
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operation of the firm, but they are not surplus themselves.104 Surplus, properly
defined, is the value that the firm generates for consumers after all costs of
production have been paid. Profits are the share of that surplus that the firm
appropriates for itself. Because profits are a share of surplus, but not of costs,
profits are never necessary for the efficient operation of the firm.105 As soon as
they do become necessary, they stop being profits, stop being a part of surplus, and
become costs.
In other words, once costs have been paid, there is no one else, whether an
owner, entrepreneur, inventor, or god of production, who must be given some
additional reward in order to be made willing to help the firm produce efficiently.106
The covering of costs is enough to achieve efficient production. Investors,
entrepreneurs, inventors, managers, suppliers, janitors, loving spouses keeping
dinner warm on late nights, and the amazon jungle patiently oxygenating the
atmosphere, all enable the firm to produce efficiently. The payments it takes, or, in
the case of externalities, should take, to make them supply what the firm needs from
them to do that all count as costs.107 What is left over once those costs are paid
alone constitutes the surplus and profits that are the subject of the corporate
mission debate.108 Arguments that profits are necessary to cover costs, such as the
Chicago School’s argument that profits are needed to cover fixed costs, are not
arguments about the distribution of surplus at all. They miss the point of the
corporate mission debate.

104. See Greenwood, supra note 62, at 112. This follows directly from the notion that the costs
of production include the value of all opportunities foregone in order to produce. See James
M. Buchanan, Opportunity Cost, in THE WORLD OF ECONOMICS 520, 520 ( John Eatwell et al. eds.,
1991). Whatever must be foregone is necessary. For a discussion of the relationship between necessity
and cost, see Woodcock, supra note 12, at 127 n.56.
105. See MARSHALL, supra note 57, at 103, 668–69 n.1.
106. See BAUMOL, supra note 98, at 593 (defining “surplus” as “any payment in excess of the
amount necessary to have the input in question supplied”); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL
ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 4 (4th ed. 2011) (defining
“‘economic’ . . . profits” as “profits in excess of . . . the amount needed to maintain investment in the
industry”). Because costs in the economic sense include any payments to shareholders required to
reward them for investing in the firm, the redistribution of profits to non-shareholders, where profits
are understood to be firm revenues in excess of costs, cannot, by definition, deprive firms of access to
investors, lead to capital flight, or have any other effects on the firm that might reduce the efficiency
or viability of the firm’s operations. To suppose that shareholders must always be rewarded with the
entirety of a firms’ profits in order to be willing to invest is to deny the possibility that firms can ever
generate profits, properly defined, at all. This point will be taken up in greater depth in the context of
all fixed costs, not just the cost of capital, in just a few more paragraphs.
107. Externalities are harms inflicted by a firm on those who lack a legal right to compensation
for the damage. The dollar value of externalities must be taken into account in calculating the magnitude
of the surplus generated by a firm. See infra text accompanying note 156.
108. See BLAUG, supra note 83, at 458 (“[S]ticking to our definition of pure profit as being
neither an opportunity cost nor a real cost, we can define it as a residual left over after all contractual
costs have been met, including the transfer costs of management, insurable risks, depreciation and
payments to shareholders sufficient to maintain investment at current levels.”).
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In the language of economics, the Chicago School fails to distinguish between
profits and quasi-profits in its argument about fixed costs. Quasi-profit is the
portion of a firm’s revenues left over after the firm pays its variable costs, meaning
costs associated with specific units or volumes of output.109 The firm pays fixed
costs out of quasi-profits and the residual is the firm’s profits, its share of the
surplus generated by its productive activities.110 In arguing that firms need profits
to pay fixed costs, the Chicago School is really arguing that firms need their
quasi-profits to pay fixed costs. That is not an argument about how profits should
be distributed, but rather an argument about how quasi-profits should be
distributed. But only once that distribution has been carried out, and costs have
been deducted from quasi-profits, does the distributive question what to do with
the genuine, non-quasi-, profit that remains actually arise.
Even if it were sound, the argument that profits are necessary to cover fixed
costs does not really support profit maximization, because the argument explains
only why profits should be high enough to cover costs, but not why profits should
always be so high as to appropriate from consumers every last penny of the surplus
generated by firms. To get to full appropriation of the surplus, the argument must
explain why fixed costs should always happen to be precisely equal to the surplus
generated by the firm, necessitating the appropriation of the entire surplus by the
firm in order to cover fixed costs. Otherwise, fixed costs may fall below the total
amount of surplus generated by the firm, in which case the firm would not need to
appropriate the entire surplus, and so the firm would not be compelled, on
efficiency grounds, to maximize profits. Shareholders, entrepreneurs, and
innovators must be paid. But why should their price always equal the surplus they
help to create?
b. The Profit Motive
To make the case that firms should always be permitted to take the entire
surplus, the Chicago School must argue that taking the entire surplus, and not just
whatever share is needed to compensate shareholders, entrepreneurs, or innovators
for their services, is efficient. The obvious move to make is to argue that in fact the
entire surplus really is the reward that the firm requires to function efficiently. And
that is exactly what the Chicago School does argue. The Chicago School claims that
because firms are motivated by the pursuit of profit, firms will not be properly
motivated to operate efficiently unless they can take the entire surplus that they
create for themselves as profit. A firm will never act to maximize surplus, rather

109. An excellent early discussion of these concepts, in which “prime cost” substitutes for
variable cost and “supplementary cost” for fixed cost, may be found in 1 ALFRED MARSHALL,
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 434–37 (3d ed. 1895). See also Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 324–25. The
distinction between profits and quasi-profits is sometimes referred to as the distinction between
economic profits and accounting profits. See Raj Aggarwal, Using Economic Profit to Assess
Performance: A Metric for Modern Firms, 44 BUS. HORIZONS 55, 55–56 (2001).
110. See MARSHALL, supra note 109, at 434–37.
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than profit, the Chicago School argues, so long as the firm’s profit and the surplus
created by the firm are not one and the same.111 Absent that unity, a time will come
when the firm could take an action that would increase the surplus the firm
generates, but that action would not increase the firm’s profits, and so the firm
would fail to act. Only giving the entire surplus to the firm as profits ensures that
the firm will always have an incentive to maximize surplus, and therefore to operate
efficiently.112 It follows immediately that paying the entire surplus over to the
firm—which means allowing the firm fully to maximize its profits—is actually
necessary for efficiency, and since any payment necessary for efficient production
counts as a cost of production, it follows immediately as well that the entire surplus
is actually a cost that legitimately must be turned over to the firm.113
This argument vanquished antitrust starting in the 1970s, causing enforcers to
fear that in driving down prices they were in fact harming efficiency.114 The
argument’s triumph corresponded with a resurgence of interest in the intellectual
property laws and their rationale of promoting investment in innovation by
increasing the share of the surplus that innovative firms can appropriate out of the
total that they create through their innovative activities.115 Appropriability gives

111. Joseph Schumpeter is the father of this view and its most explicit proponent. See
SCHUMPETER, supra note 103, at 89–90 (arguing that in the “majority” of cases monopolies just cover
costs). It is suggested by: WARD S. BOWMAN, PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC APPRAISAL (1973); Dennis W. Carlton, A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and
Refusal to Deal—Why Aspen and Kodak Are Misguided, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 659, 674 (2001); John
E. Lopatka, United States v. IBM: A Monument to Arrogance, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 145, 156 (2000).
Richard Brunell provides a number of other examples of this view. See Richard M. Brunell,
Appropriability in Antitrust: How Much Is Enough?, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 27–28 (2001) (sources
cited therein).
112. See Brunell, supra note 111, at 27–28.
113. For necessary payments as costs, see text and sources supra note 104. The Chicago School’s
argument here was a transposition, from the level of the firm to the level of the market, of the classic
agency argument in corporate law that a manager will never completely maximize the profits of the
firm unless the manager has a right to all of the firm’s profits. See Michael C. Jensen & William
H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3
J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308, 312 (1976) (“[I]t is generally impossible for the principal or the agent at zero
cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions from the principal’s viewpoint. . . . If a wholly
owned firm is managed by the owner, [however,] he will make operating decisions which maximize his
utility.”). Now the argument was that the surplus created by production would not be maximized unless
the firm, which controls the generation of the surplus by controlling production, has a right to all of
the surplus the firm creates, and does not have to share it with consumers. For more on the agency
problem in corporate law, and the fact that corporate law scholars generally acknowledge that the
problem can be solved, at least approximately, see infra Section I.C.2.a.
114. See BORK, supra note 61, at 396 (arguing that price discrimination, in permitting a
monopolist to extract a greater share of surplus from consumers, will induce “greater innovative
effort”); Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004) (extolling
monopoly profits as incentives to firms to innovate); Easterbrook, supra note 67, at 15 (arguing that
“in many cases the costs of monopoly wrongly permitted are small, while the costs of competition
wrongly condemned are large”).
115. William Nordhaus sparked a large literature on optimal patent life that took as foundation
the notion that a firm’s incentive to invest in innovation is determined by the share of the surplus the
firm can extract from consumers. See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND

First to Printer_Woodcock.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

ANTITRUST AS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

6/10/20 9:12 PM

1417

firms an incentive to maximize surplus, argued economists, because the larger the
surplus that firms create, the larger the surplus that firms are able to appropriate as
profits. And so more appropriability was therefore urged.116 Congress created a
specialized patent appeals court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, which proceeded to bullet proof patent grants against challenge, and
appropriability became a watchword too in antitrust, a kind of universal rejoinder
to anyone arguing for more enforcement and lower prices.117 Firms, it was
everywhere said, would only invest in innovations that increase the value enjoyed
by consumers or reduce production costs if firms could hope to capture as reward
some of the expanded surplus created thereby. And the more surplus they could
hope to capture, the harder innovative firms would work to increase product value
and reduce costs.118
Of course, the argument that surplus should be distributed entirely to firms
because that is necessary for efficient production fails to engage the question what
to do with surplus, understood as value that is not actually necessary for efficient
production, just as much as the argument about fixed costs fails to engage that
question.119 But the argument takes the confusion between costs and surplus to an
extreme, by suggesting that there really is no surplus at all, no value that can be
distributed or redistributed on moral grounds without upsetting the efficiency of
the operations of the firm. The argument is a denial of the distributive problem par
excellence.
But that is in a way the least of the argument’s problems. For the argument
leads to an absurdity that no one has quite seemed to appreciate. The trouble is that
if all surplus should really be cost, then the motivation for maximizing surplus, and
indeed for pursuing economic efficiency, is destroyed.120 The entire value of an
economy is exclusively the extent to which that economy generates surplus.121 When
there is no surplus, engaging in economic activity, whether buying or selling, offers

WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1969). For a survey of this
literature, see SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 100, at 621–44.
116. See SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 100, at 622–24; BOWMAN, supra note 111; Vincenzo
Denicolò, Do Patents Over-Compensate Innovators?, 22 ECON. POL’Y 680, 713 (2007) (arguing that
appropriability is currently suboptimal).
117. For the effect of the Federal Circuit on patent litigation, see James Bessen & Michael
J. Meurer, The Patent Litigation Explosion, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 401, 428–29 (2013) (sources cited therein).
For appropriability in antitrust, see Brunell, supra note 111, at 2–3.
118. See, e.g., Teece & Coleman, supra note 67, at 820–22.
119. See supra paragraph accompanying note 104.
120. Only the few economists who have sought to find the patent life that optimizes consumer,
rather than total, surplus, have seemed to understand this problem. See Denicolò, supra note 116, at
721–22 (discussing the “gap between the social and private returns to R&D”). What use is the
maximization of total surplus if consumers can enjoy no part of it?
121. This follows immediately from the definition of surplus as the excess of value over cost.
If the value of economic activity, as measured by the consumers who enjoy the economy’s fruits, does
not exceed the value of the pain required to produce those fruits, which pain is commonly known as
cost, then economic activity has no value and society would be better off doing nothing.
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no real advantage to buyer or seller.122 If consumers must pay an amount for a good
that is just equal to the value that consumers place on that good, then consumers
get more or less zero value from consuming that good.123 If that price represents
cost, then the producer is more or less no better off from engaging in production
of the good than the producer would be doing the producer’s next best alternative
activity.124 The project of maximizing a surplus that must be spent on its own
maximization is like aspiring from producing one dandelion at the cost of one
dandelion to producing a field of dandelions at the cost of a field of dandelions.125
The Chicago School succeeds at establishing the efficiency of profit maximization
only by taking the position that the economy is incapable of improving lives, which,
if true, would eliminate the rationale for pursuing efficiency in the first place.126
An equally important flaw in the argument that firms must appropriate all
surplus in order to operate efficiently arises from the argument’s misunderstanding
of the mathematics of incentives. To align the interests of the firm perfectly with
the interests of society, the entire surplus need not be given to firms as profits,
contrary to the Chicago School’s argument. The intuition that the surplus created
by productive activity, as the measure of its value, must also be the proper measure
of the incentive required to induce that activity is incorrect.127 The size of the reward
122. See Ramsi A. Woodcock, Personalized Pricing as Monopolization, 51 CONN. L. REV. 311,
321–25 (2019) [hereinafter Woodcock, Personalized Pricing as Monopolization] (showing, in the context
of personalized pricing, how allowing firms to appropriate all of the surplus they create harms
consumers); Ramsi A. Woodcock, Big Data, Price Discrimination, and Antitrust, 68 HASTINGS
L.J. 1371, 1390 (2017) [hereinafter Woodcock, Big Data, Price Discrimination, and Antitrust].
123. See VARIAN, supra note 60, at 4 (“[A] person’s reservation price is the highest price at which
he or she is just indifferent between purchasing or not purchasing the good.”).
124. See id. at 410 (“[W]ith zero profits, all of the factors of production are being paid their
market price—the same market price that these factors could earn elsewhere.”).
125. See Woodcock, Personalized Pricing as Monopolization, supra note 122, at 321–25;
Woodcock, Big Data, Price Discrimination, and Antitrust, supra note 122, at 1390.
126. It is no use arguing that the maximum that can be extracted from consumers is not the
true extent of the value enjoyed by consumers, because competition from other firms gives consumers
other options that reduce their willingness to pay for a firm’s products. See Woodcock, Personalized
Pricing as Monopolization, supra note 122, at 323–24. For the Chicago School’s argument is that
competition should be reduced to permit firms to extract the maximum possible value from consumers.
See BOWMAN, supra note 111. The effect of reducing competition is not just to allow prices to rise, but
also to increase consumers’ willingness to pay, as the number of alternatives available to consumers
falls. See Woodcock, Personalized Pricing as Monopolization, supra note 122, at 323–24. So the Chicago
School argues precisely for the reductions in competition that ensure that consumer willingness to pay
accurately measures the true extent of the value enjoyed by consumers from purchasing a given product.
Which means that the extraction of all of that value really does leave consumers with nothing.
127. This view may have its origin in analyses of price regulation where the regulator lacks
information on the firm’s costs and the firm seeks to maximize its profits. In this limited context, “the
firm will operate at minimum cost and attempt to satisfy the needs and desires of customers only if it
is awarded [by the price regulator] the full surplus that its activities generate.” Mark Armstrong & David
E. M. Sappington, Regulation, Competition, and Liberalization, 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE 325, 331
(2006). But if a regulator has information on a firm’s costs, the regulator can reproduce the incentive
structure created by allowing the firm to take the entirety of the surplus as profits by setting the firm’s
prices just high enough to cover its costs, plus a fixed and very tiny percentage of the surplus the firm
generates, as discussed in detail in this and the following paragraphs.
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needed to create an incentive to engage in productive activity is determined by the
alternatives available to firms, not by the size of the surplus that firms create.128 To
maximize surplus, it is necessary only that the firm stand to earn more
compensation maximizing surplus than by doing anything else.129 The scale against
which compensation must be measured is not the absolute size of the surplus
created by the firm but the most money the firm could make doing something
else.130 Indeed, as will become clear in the next section, the scale is not even set by
the best alternative of the firm as a whole but rather the best alternative of whoever
controls the firm. To create the proper incentive for efficient operation of the firm,
it is necessary only that whoever has control of production, whether financier,
investor, entrepreneur, worker, or other contributor, stand to earn more
compensation from inducing the firm to maximize surplus than from doing
anything else.131 But for now, continue to consider the firm, and not those
controlling it, as the subject that must receive the proper incentive to
maximize surplus.
Suppose, for example, that a firm produces a good worth $8.00 to consumers,
and sells the good at a price of $8.00, but that a no-cost improvement can be made
to the good that would drive the good’s value for consumers up to $10.00,
representing an increase in surplus of $2.00. The Chicago School’s argument is that
the only way to guarantee that the firm will adopt the improvement is to allow the
firm to appropriate the entire $2.00 increase in surplus created by the improvement,
by allowing the firm to charge a price of $10.00 for the improved good.132
According to this view, allowing the antitrust laws to promote competition that
prevents the firm from charging $10.00 will reduce the firm’s incentive to make the
improvement, by making the improvement less profitable for the firm.133 The result
of the Chicago School’s approach is that the firm improves the product, but because
128. See VARIAN, supra note 60, at 410–11 (discussing opportunity costs).
129. See text and sources cited supra note 104. This argument assumes that people are rational
actors in the sense that they always choose their best alternative employment, even if that alternative is
only preferable to other alternatives by a vanishingly small amount. This assumption is not as absurd as
it might at first appear. Suppose, for example, that a worker can either work at Wendy’s for $7.00 per
hour or McDonald’s for $7.50 per hour, but that the worker considers the two wages so similar as to
be indifferent between them in practice. The argument here is not that the worker should be assumed
anyway to choose the $7.50 wage simply because it is slightly higher than the $7.00 wage offered by
Wendy’s. The argument is that to induce the worker to choose a particular employment, the wage must
be set just high enough to ensure that the worker is no longer indifferent between the two employments.
So, for example, if the worker would cease to be indifferent between the two employments if the
McDonald’s wage were $8.50, then $8.50 would be the wage that is just high enough to induce the
employee to work for McDonald’s, even though that wage would be $1.50 greater than the worker’s
next-best alternative employment earning $7.00 at Wendy’s.
130. See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 335
(7th ed. 2006) (“[I]f an individual works in his own firm, then his labor is an input and it should be
counted as part of the costs. His wage rate is simply the market price of his labor—what he would be
getting if he sold his labor on the open market.”). Subject to the qualification discussed supra note 129.
131. See infra Section I.C.2.a.
132. See, e.g., BOWMAN, supra note 111.
133. See supra text and sources in note 111.
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consumers pay $10.00 for a good upon which they place a value of $10.00, the
surplus consumers gain from the improvement is $0.00.
But the same result can be achieved by limiting the firm to appropriating cost
plus 1% of the surplus the firm generates on the good, as opposed to allowing the
firm to appropriate all of the surplus. For what matters in creating the proper
incentive is only that the firm’s fortunes rise as the firm generates more surplus,
not that the firm be able to take all of the surplus the firm generates. So long as the
firm’s percentage share of the surplus remains constant, the firm’s fortunes will
move in sync with changes in surplus, and so the firm will have an incentive to
make the surplus as large as possible. At cost plus 1% of surplus, the firm’s profits
will rise by two pennies if the firm implements the improvement, making the firm
better off relative to the firm’s next-best alternative of doing nothing. And better,
regardless of magnitude, is all that the firm, or any rational profit-seeking entity,
requires to act.134
Moreover, if greater improvements become available, the firm will pursue
them as well. If the firm discovers a new technology that would increase the value
of the product to $11.00, instead of $10.00, the firm will choose that technology
over the one that only increases value to $10.00, because the firm’s profit on the
$11.00 technology is 1% of the $3.00 of surplus created by that technology, or $0.03,
whereas the firm’s profit on the $10.00 technology is 1% of the $2.00 surplus
created by that technology, or only $0.02. The nice thing about limiting
appropriability to 1%, from the perspective of consumers, is that the share of the
surplus generated by the improvement jumps from $0.00, when the firm
appropriates the entire surplus, to $1.98, when the firm implements the $10.00
technology, to $2.97 when the firm implements the $11.00 technology. Under this
incentive-minimization approach, efficiency is preserved—the firm maximizes the
surplus the firm generates on this good—and consumers take virtually all of
that surplus.
Thus a rule requiring that firms charge prices just high enough to cover costs,
inclusive of the cost of creating a small but genuine incentive for firms to improve
their products, will not deter innovation and indeed will maintain every incentive
for the firm to maximize the surplus the firm generates.135 Indeed, in our example,

134. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
135. In other words, suppose that the benefits to consumers of production effort undertaken
by a particular firm are
and the costs of production to the firm are
. Consumers want the
firm to maximize the net benefit
. Maximization takes place when the effort level equalizes
marginal benefit and marginal cost:
. Suppose that the firm enjoys a positive fraction
of the net benefit conferred on consumers by production. That is, the firm’s profit is
. Then
the firm will choose to maximize
, which, because does not vary with effort, takes place
when the fraction of marginal benefit equals the fraction of marginal cost:
.
Dividing through by , it is evident that the firm will choose to satisfy the same condition that
consumers would choose to satisfy, so the the firm chooses will still maximize net benefit. If is
chosen to be very, very small, then the firm’s profit will be vanishingly small, and consumers will enjoy
the entire maximized net benefit of production.
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the percentage of the surplus provided to the firm as compensation can be made
arbitrarily small—reduced to 0.1% or 0.01% or 0.001%—while still preserving the
incentive for the firm to maximize surplus. So long as the firm receives a price high
enough to cover the costs of the improvement plus some incentive payment keyed
to being at its greatest when surplus is greatest, the firm will have an incentive to
maximize surplus.136 The incentive payment, when minimized, is itself a cost of
efficient production.137 The entirety of the surplus, once that vanishing amount is
deducted, can be left for consumers without any efficiency loss. Antitrust enforcers
can therefore promote competition without worrying that in reducing firm profits
competition will prevent firms from maximizing surplus, at least so long as firms
refuse to compete prices below levels required to give them some small residual
incentive to engage in that maximization project. More importantly, for purposes
of this Article, adherence to a proper incentive rule is implicit in the duty imposed
by antitrust’s consumer welfare standard to minimize profits, as will be discussed in
Part II.
2. In the Corporate Mission Debates
a. In Shareholder Primacy Advocacy
The flaws in the Chicago School’s case for profit maximization did not stop
the Chicago School from winning the profit-maximization debate in antitrust for a
time.138 But winning on profit maximization only advanced the Chicago School’s
broader cause of shareholder primacy half of the way toward its goal of ensuring
that shareholders get access to the entirety of the surplus generated by the firm.139
For profit maximization means only that consumers should get nothing, not that
shareholders, as opposed to workers, managers, suppliers, or anyone else who might
plausibly be described as a firm insider, should get access to the surplus once it has
been fully appropriated from consumers by the firm in the form of profits.
The natural answer to the question which kind of insider should get the surplus
is: the insider who manages the firm, not shareholders as a group.140 If the basis for
giving the entire surplus to the firm is that the firm decides how to organize
production and therefore requires the entire surplus in order to have an incentive
to maximize it, then by extension it is the firm insider who actually controls the
operations of the firm who should ultimately receive the entire surplus in order to
have the proper incentive to induce the firm to maximize the surplus.141 That poses
a problem for advocates of shareholder value maximization, because shareholders

136. The size of the percentage is subject to the qualification discussed supra note 129.
137. Because that incentive payment is necessary for efficient production. See BAUMOL, supra
note 98, at 593.
138. See supra paragraph accompanying note 114.
139. For the Chicago School’s shareholder primacy goal, see supra Section I.A.
140. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 113, at 308, 312.
141. See id.
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rarely control the management of the firm.142 They are passive, relying on
professional managers to operate the business.143 Which means that managers, and
not shareholders, should take the surplus, at least if the appropriability argument is
to be applied consistently.144 And that in turn would seem to mean that efficiency
does not support shareholder primacy after all.
The Chicago School managed to overcome this problem with the aid of a
brilliant inconsistency. The Chicago School argued that within the firm surplus does
not need to be allocated in its entirety to the party in control, because the incentives
of managers can be brought tolerably into line with those of shareholders even if
managers do not take the entire surplus. But at the same time the Chicago School
took the position that outside of the firm, in the market as a whole, the incentives
of the firm cannot be brought into line with the goal of maximizing surplus unless
the entire surplus is paid over to the firm.145 According to the Chicago School,
managers could be made to work efficiently while shareholders, as “residual
claimants,” ate what those managers produced, but firms could not be made to
operate efficiently while consumers ate what the firms produced.146 The Chicago
School could maintain this intellectual contradiction only because CSR never
followed the Chicago School across disciplinary boundaries into antitrust law, and
so there was no one with a foot in both corporate law and antitrust law with an
interest in pointing out the inconsistency in the Chicago School’s positions.147
The Chicago School executed this sleight of hand in the form of the
now-famous “agency problem” of corporate governance, the problem of how to
ensure that managers act as the agents of shareholders, maximizing the firm’s
profits on their behalf.148 The Chicago School’s solution to the agency problem was

142. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in
the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 24–34 (2001).
143. See id.
144. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 113, at 312.
145. See STEPHEN MARTIN, ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 384–85 (2d ed. 2002)
(describing a basic agency model in which the principal seeks to maximize the principal’s utility “net of
compensation” to the agent); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control,
26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 302–03 (1983) (assuming that the shareholders in a corporation have the right to
“residual claims” defined as “net cash flows”). Thus the starting point for Michael Jensen’s famous
article laying the groundwork for agency theory is that the manager sells some shares in the corporation,
leaving the manager with less than a full claim, in Jensen’s view, over the profits of the corporation. See
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 113, at 312. The other major inconsistency in Chicago School advocacy
of shareholder primacy is the Chicago School’s inconsistent treatment of profits and costs. See supra
Section I.C.1.
146. See STOUT, supra note 5, at 35 (observing that shareholder primacy advocates assume that
shareholders have a legal right to the profit); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various
Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON
L. REV. 23, 24 (1991) (assuming that shareholders are residual claimants).
147. See supra Section I.A.
148. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 113, at 308, 312 (arguing that if the owner manages the
firm, then management will maximize the utility of the owner and that once management’s ownership
stake falls, utility will no longer be maximized). The shareholder rights literature in law and the
principal-agent literature in economics are both devoted to this problem. For an example of the
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to give management a fraction of the firm’s profits in order to create an incentive
for management to maximize profits, just as, in the example in Section I.C.1.b, the
solution to the problem of giving a firm the incentive to maximize surplus without
giving the firm the entire surplus was to give the firm a constant fraction—1% in
the example—of the surplus.149 In other words, in fashioning solutions to the
agency problem, the Chicago School relied upon precisely the distinction between
surplus and costs that the movement has denied in arguing for profit maximization
as a goal.150 Stuck in corporate law, CSR missed this sleight of hand entirely. The
result is a bipolar shareholder primacy advocacy, in which in the corporate
governance arena advocates seem aware of the distinction between distribution and
efficiency, and understand that controllers do not require all of the surplus
generated by the firm in order to act efficiently, but at the same time, in attacking
the antitrust laws, advocates confuse costs and surplus and insist that controllers
must have access to the entirety of the surplus in order to behave efficiently.
b. In CSR
CSR has not avoided the cost confusion that has plagued shareholder primacy
advocacy.151 For example, CSR has argued that giving profits to shareholders can
deprive firms of the funds they need to invest in the long term, leading to lower
long-term profits for firms.152 The trouble with this argument is that any profits
needed to maximize long-run profits actually are costs of production. Profit is an
atemporal quantity, the total excess of the surplus that the firm appropriates from
consumers, in the form of revenues, over the costs of production, summed up over
the entire lifetime of the firm.153 If long-term investments are required to maximize

principal-agent literature in economics, see Fama & Jensen, supra note 145, at 302–03. For an example
of the shareholder rights literature, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power,
118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 850 (2005) (“In publicly traded companies with dispersed ownership, the
interests of management do not fully overlap with those of shareholders, and management thus cannot
be automatically counted on to take actions that would serve shareholder interests. As a result, agency
costs that reduce shareholder value might arise. . . . Adequate governance arrangements, however, can
provide constraints and incentives that reduce deviations from shareholder-value maximization.”).
149. See supra the paragraphs following note 127. Agency models usually assume that the
principal has imperfect information about the agent’s behavior, causing the costs actually incurred by
the agent to be uncertain from the principal’s perspective. See MARTIN, supra note 145, at 384–85. This
does not alter the basic character of these arguments as attempts at minimizing the inducement required
to make management maximize profits on behalf of shareholders, but it does make these arguments
somewhat more complicated than the simple numerical example described supra in the text
accompanying note 127.
150. See supra Section I.C.1.
151. For shareholder primacy advocates’ confusion of cost with surplus, see supra Section I.C.1.
152. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 691, 703 (2010).
153. A leading finance textbook draws a distinction between short-run profit maximization,
which the book simply calls profit maximization, and the maximization of the net present value of the
firm, which is calculated by summing revenues at all current and future time periods net of opportunity
costs. See RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 20–25 (8th ed. 2006). By long-run
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that number, then those investments are costs of the firm, not profits.154 The
argument that firms are not investing enough in the long run because management
is giving too much money to shareholders tells an important story about
mismanagement but says nothing about who should take the firm’s long-run profits
once they have been maximized.
A second example of CSR’s miscategorization of costs is CSR’s argument that
firms should be free to spend their profits on compensation for victims of
externalities.155 Externalities are harms inflicted by a firm on those who lack a legal
right to compensation for the damage.156 Because the firm does not need to pay
compensation for externalities, the firm does not try to avoid inflicting them.157
That is a problem for the economy because the harms that a firm inflicts on others
are costs of production.158 Labor is a cost of production, for example, only because
working harms workers, which is why workers demand a wage in exchange for
working.159 It follows that any payments, voluntary or otherwise, made to victims
by firms to cover externalities are not distributions of profits at all, but rather the

profit maximization I mean the maximization of net present value. See also SILBERBERG, supra note 22,
at 416–17 (showing how to use present value to maximize value over multiple time periods).
154. See text and sources cited supra note 104.
155. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 5, at 735–38 (arguing that corporate law would not prevent
firms from sacrificing profits to prevent the externalities associated with clear-cutting a forest).
156. Economics texts typically define an externality as behavior of one agent that affects
another agent. See, e.g., VARIAN, supra note 130, at 600. But in an interconnected world, that definition
is overbroad. When a buyer buys a product from a seller, the buyer’s behavior affects the seller, but this
is not an externality. What distinguishes externalities from other forms of interconnection between
agents is that an externality has a harmful effect for which the victim cannot seek compensation. Buying
creates no externality because the seller demands compensation from the buyer as a condition of
allowing the buyer access to the product. And if the buyer takes without payment, the law provides the
seller a remedy. By contrast, in the absence of nuisance laws, pollution from a factory may inflict harms
on neighbors for which the neighbors have no legal remedy. That is a classic example of an externality.
See id. at 632. This definition is immanent in many economics texts. See, e.g., MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra
note 9, at 356 (describing an agent who has a legal right to prevent activity by another that would inflict
harm on the agent as “externality-free”). The foregoing describes negative externalities. Positive
externalities arise when activity confers a benefit on a recipient for which the actor, as opposed to the
target, has no legal right to compensation.
157. See VARIAN, supra note 60, at 636 (“[I]f the private costs and the social costs diverge, the
market alone may not be sufficient to achieve Pareto efficiency.”).
158. This follows from the fact that the concept of surplus is meant to capture the concept of
net gain to society. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 83, at 42–43 (discussing cost-benefit analysis). It
follows that surplus must be the benefits to society of economic activity less the harms to society of
economic activity. And the surplus created by a particular firm must be the benefits the firm creates
for society less the harms the firm inflicts on society, with those harms stretching from the harms the
firm inflicts on its own workers on down to the pollution the firm dumps on pollution victims as part
of the firm’s activities. For a firm to maximize the surplus that the firm creates, the firm must therefore
consider all of the harms associated with the firm’s activities, not just those for which the firm is
required by law to pay compensation, and balance them against the benefits of the
firm’s activities.
159. See VARIAN, supra note 130, at 174 (observing that the wage compensates for the loss of
enjoyment associated with leisure).
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payment of costs.160 When CSR urges that firms allocate profits to pay victims who
otherwise would go without compensation, CSR is not redistributing profits but
rather ensuring that the firm pays all of the costs that the firm creates, including
those for which the firm is not legally obligated to pay compensation.161 The surplus
that the firm spends on these externalities is not really surplus but cost, so here, too,
a putatively distributive argument turns out really to be an argument about costs.
A third example of CSR’s miscategorization of costs is CSR’s argument that
management must have the authority to allocate profits to team members on an ad
hoc basis, instead of paying profits to shareholders, in order to give team members
the proper incentive to work hard for the firm.162 It is rarely clear precisely how
much of the value of a team effort is due to any particular team member.163 If the
team decides compensation in advance, argues CSR, then team members may freeride on the work of others. But if the team decides compensation after the fact,
argues CSR, then team members may worry about losing out to other members who
want to increase their share of the profits.164 According to CSR, vesting power in
management to decide allocation of the surplus on an ad hoc basis, rather than
fixing compensation before or after the fact, creates a neutral arbiter that can
monitor shirking and reward hard work.165 But management can only exercise this
power, argues CSR, if shareholder primacy does not require that managers reserve
all of their firms’ profits for shareholders.
The trouble with CSR’s team production argument against shareholder
primacy is that it is not really an argument for redistribution of profits. Instead,
team production is an argument for realizing managerial and labor efficiencies by
incurring additional costs. The argument is in effect that the performance of the
team, and presumably therefore the profits the team creates, will increase if
management can allocate profits to different team members on an ad hoc basis.166
All profits allocated to team members to improve performance are then not really
profits but only costs, because the allocations are necessary to induce team
members to operate the firm efficiently.167 The real distributive question faced by
management is what to do with any profits left over once the teamwork problem

160. These payments are not costs in the sense that the firm must pay them to be able to
produce, because the fact that these payments are not compelled by law makes them unnecessary to
induce production by the firm. See BAUMOL, supra note 98, at 593. But they are costs in the sense that
they are necessary for the firm to produce efficiently. If the firm does not make these payments, then
the firm will not take all harms inflicted by production into account, and therefore will fail to act in
ways that maximize surplus rather than profits. See VARIAN, supra note 60, at 636. To the extent that
corporate law is concerned with inducing firms to operate efficiently, corporate law must understand
these payments to count as costs.
161. See VARIAN, supra note 60, at 636.
162. See Blair & Stout, supra note 25, at 271–76.
163. See id. at 249–50.
164. See id.
165. See id. at 250–51.
166. See id. at 270–71.
167. See text and sources cited supra note 104.
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has been solved and all ad hoc payments have been made to the team. The question
of how to allocate compensation among team members to solve teamwork
problems is a matter of efficiency, not distribution.168
II. ANTITRUST AS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. The Distributive Powers of the Board Under Corporate Law
In the absence of an economic reason for which any particular group should
get the surplus, the question how the wealth generated by firms should be
distributed can be resolved only by interminable debate regarding what distributive
justice requires.169 While that debate festers, however, the distributive question is
resolved in the meantime by the law, to which I now turn. It will become clear that,
when corporate law and antitrust law are read together, the law opposes shareholder
primacy and indeed mandates that firms minimize profits. It will also become clear
that the Chicago School itself has inadvertently brought about this result.
The state of corporate law today is the product of two opposing forces. The
first is a shareholder-primacy-based interpretation of corporate boards’ fiduciary
duty of care that holds that boards must maximize profits and pay those profits to
shareholders. This interpretation operates as a default interpretation of the law,
which is then modified by the second force. That second force consists of a
multitude of doctrinal attacks levied upon the shareholder primacy interpretation
by CSR.170 Many of these attacks fail to displace the shareholder primacy
interpretation, either as a matter of doctrine or effect, but not all.

168. See STOUT, supra note 5, at 80–81 (arguing that shareholders benefit when the board can
allocate surplus to facilitate team production).
169. See supra Section I.B.
170. For the shareholder primacy interpretation, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for
Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 604 (2006) (“To be sure, shareholders own
the residual claim on the corporation’s assets and earnings.”); Bainbridge, supra note 55, at 697;
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 468; RICHARD A. POSNER & KENNETH E. SCOTT,
ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION 90 (1980). The shareholder
primacy interpretation is reflected in Delaware caselaw. See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming
Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007) (“It is well settled that directors owe fiduciary
duties to the corporation. . . . [I]ts shareholders . . . are the ultimate beneficiaries of the corporation’s
growth and increased value.”) (internal citations omitted); In re Rural Metro Corp., 88 A.3d 54, 80
(Del. Ch. 2014) (stating that “directors’ fiduciary duties require that they seek to promote the value of
the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders”) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Commentators often cite to the Model Business Corporation Act, which states that directors must act
“in the best interests of the corporation,” even though that language does not mention shareholders.
REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT, § 8.30(a) (Am. Bar Ass’n, 2016); D. Gordon Smith,
The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 285 n.30 (1998) (citing that language); Elhauge, supra
note 5, at 769 n.89 (same); Greenwood, supra note 62, at 124 n.66 (same). Gordon Smith notes that
“the language is generally understood to coincide with the best long-term interests of the shareholders.”
Smith, supra, at 285, 285 n.32 (sources cited therein).
For the myriad attempts to undermine the orthodoxy, see STOUT, supra note 5, at 32, 39 (any
fiduciary duty to maximize profits and pay them to shareholders applies only in the long run, and
shareholders have a right to payment by the firm only when the firm declares bankruptcy); Elhauge,
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Perhaps the highest profile of CSR’s attacks is CSR’s argument that any
fiduciary duty of a corporate board to maximize profits and pay them to
shareholders applies only in the long run.171 But this argument is ultimately of little
aid to consumers seeking to escape shareholder primacy’s profit-maximizing scythe,
however, because even if the argument is correct as a matter of law, the power of
the argument to turn back shareholder primacy is predicated on the cost confusion
described in Section I.C.172 Tension between short- and long-term profit
maximization arises only when short-run profits are better spent on long-run
investments than on payments to shareholders.173 But when that is the case, the
short-run profits that ought to be invested are really costs of production, required
to maximize the overall profits of the firm once the proceeds of the long-run
investments are taken into account.174 So in establishing that firms may sacrifice
short-run profits for long-run gain, CSR has merely given boards leeway to more
fully maximize profits. But CSR has not through this change undermined the basic
rule of shareholder primacy that firms must always strive to maximize profits and
give them to shareholders.
At the same time that CSR has advanced the long-run profit-maximization
argument, CSR has seemed to acknowledge the argument’s limitations by suggesting
that the real utility of establishing the board’s right to engage in long-run profit
maximization is actually rhetorical and strategic.175 CSR has argued that long-run
profit maximization enables boards in practice to allocate profits however they
wish, even when the allocation does not actually maximize long-run profits, because
boards can use claims that they are engaging in long-run profit maximization to
insulate their allocation decisions behind the business judgment rule.176 That rule
requires that judges defer to business decisions, including decisions regarding how
to spend profits, that are made by the board in good faith.177 CSR argues in effect
that because any profit allocation decision may plausibly be characterized as

supra note 5, at 763–69, 848–52 (fiduciary duties in fact permit both charitable donations and board
actions intended to comply with ethical rules that either reduce profits or reduce the amount of profits
distributed to shareholders, an interpretation strengthened by state corporate constituency and
charitable giving statutes, and any duty to maximize shareholder profits and pay those profits to
shareholders exists only when the board is considering an offer to buy out the shareholders);
Greenwood, supra note 62, at 121 (the power of the board to refuse to pay dividends to shareholders
reflects the absence of a shareholder right to profits); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment
Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 287, 297–303 (1994) (the business
judgment rule allows boards, at least in practice, to do whatever they want, so long as they do not engage
in self-dealing or fail entirely to prepare for important decisions).
171. See STOUT, supra note 5, at 32.
172. See id.
173. Otherwise, maximizing short-run profits will not reduce the net present value of the firm,
which includes both short- and long-run profits. See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 153, at 20–25.
174. See text and sources cited supra note 104.
175. See Smith, supra note 170, at 286; Elhauge, supra note 5, at 770–71; STOUT, supra note 5,
at 29–31.
176. See Elhauge, supra note 5, at 770–71.
177. See id.
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advancing the profitability of the firm in the very long run, long-run profit
maximization permits boards to make bad faith decisions to allocate profits to
non-shareholders in a way that cannot be detected and stopped by the courts.178
While CSR is almost certainly right to argue that in practice long-run profit
maximization and the business judgment rule interact to enable boards to allocate
profits freely without threat of legal sanction, the argument does not resolve the
legal question what the law actually requires of boards. The corporate mission
question must be answered by examination of the content of the board’s fiduciary
duty of care, not by appeal to the inability of courts effectively to enforce
that duty.179
CSR has also attacked the shareholder primacy interpretation of the duty of
care on the ground that the undeniable discretion of the board to decide whether
to pay out profits to shareholders in the form of dividends or share buybacks
implies that the board has no duty to preserve profits for the benefit of
shareholders, and that the board may pay profits out to non-shareholders instead.180
The trouble with this argument is that it does not actually follow from the discretion
of the board to decide whether to pay profits to shareholders that the board may
pay profits out to non-shareholders. The board might still have a duty to preserve
profits for shareholders by not paying profits to others, even if the board has no
duty ever actually to pay the profits so preserved out to shareholders.
Such a duty to preserve profits without necessarily paying them out is actually
consistent with shareholder primacy. Draining cash from the firm can be costly at
times when the firm requires cash to respond to emergencies or to invest. It follows
that a board can only faithfully carry out its duty to maximize profits under the
shareholder primacy interpretation of the duty of care if the board has discretion to
decide when paying profits to shareholders would be least costly to the firm.181 And

178. See id.
179. Greenwood argues that the judicial deference to business decisions created by the business
judgment rule is analogous to the courts’ post-Lochner deference to determinations made by legislatures
regarding the boundaries of their own powers. See Greenwood, supra note 62, at 135. If that were true,
then boards would be free to decide for themselves whether to depart from any shareholder primacy
rules that may otherwise be part of the duty of care. But unlike in the case of post-Lochner deference,
the business judgment rule requires that firms construe their powers in good faith. See Gevurtz, supra
note 170, at 296–303 (identifying good faith as a requirement in each of three interpretations of the
business judgment rule); Smith, supra note 170, at 285–86 (discussing the shareholder primacy fiduciary
duty). As a result, the rule does not permit boards to use long-run profit-maximization arguments in
bad faith to mask departures from shareholder primacy, if in fact shareholder primacy is part of the
duty of care.
180. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT, supra note 170, § 6.40 (providing for
distribution of dividends); STOUT, supra note 5, at 40; Greenwood, supra note 62, at 121.
181. Joseph Schumpeter makes this point well in the antitrust context when he argues that what
may look like short-run profits may actually be monies that a firm must keep on hand as insurance
against risks to future cash flows. He writes:
If for instance a war risk is insurable, nobody objects to a firm’s collecting the cost of this
insurance from the buyers of its products. But that risk is no less an element in long-run
costs, if there are no facilities for insuring against it, in which case a price strategy aiming at
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discretion regarding when to pay of course implies discretion regarding whether to
pay at all.182 But this discretion is no more than a cost-saving measure designed to
ensure that boards turn profits over to shareholders in the least costly way.183 The
discretion does not signal repudiation of the duty to maximize profits and turn them
over to shareholders that constitutes the shareholder primacy interpretation of the
duty of care.
A similar shortcoming exists in CSR’s alternative arguments that the right of
shareholders to the firm’s profits in bankruptcy, and the right of shareholders to
demand that the board obtain the best possible bid to buy out shareholders during
takeover attempts, constitute exceptions that prove the rule that in general the board
has no duty to maximize profits and preserve them for shareholders.184 In both
bankruptcy and takeover, the lifetime of existing shares in the corporation comes
to an end.185 It follows that in these cases the business decision whether it is more
costly to pay out cash to shareholders now or later no longer exists, and board
discretion to postpone the payment of profits to shareholders no longer helps to
reduce costs and maximize profits. So in these circumstances the payment of profits
to shareholders is required, as the shareholder primacy interpretation of the duty of
care demands. The fact that in these contexts the law recognizes the right of
shareholders to insist upon payment of firm profits therefore supports the
shareholder primacy position, instead of undermining it.186
CSR has also failed to show how the ethics exemption to the duty of care
undermines shareholder primacy.187 CSR has tried to argue that the exemption’s
authorization of “responsible” or “reasonable” deviations from the duty of care
permits boards to deviate from any duty to maximize profits and turn them over to

the same end will seem to involve unnecessary restriction and to be productive of
excess profits.
SCHUMPETER, supra note 103, at 88. Schumpeter’s argument is directed against arguments that firms
should charge lower prices and earn lower profits. But the argument works equally well in explaining
why firms might want to retain any profits they do generate in the short run and not pay them out to
shareholders. For the duty to maximize profits in shareholder primacy, which is mentioned elsewhere
in the cited sentence, see Roe, supra note 52, at 2066–67.
182. Because a corporation can live forever. See Carlos L. Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate
Existence: Problems of Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 778, 778 (1952) (observing that
“corporate existence is permitted to be perpetual”).
183. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 103, at 88.
184. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (stating
that when a company is for sale “the directors’ role change[s] from defenders of the corporate bastion
to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company”); Lynn
M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large,
Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 679 (1993) (observing that shareholders may receive
cash as part of a bankruptcy); Elhauge, supra note 5, at 848–52; STOUT, supra note 5, at 30–31, 39;
Greenwood, supra note 62, at 124 n.60.
185. See STOUT, supra note 5, at 30–31, 39.
186. See id.; Elhauge, supra note 5, at 848–52; Greenwood, supra note 62, at 124 n.60.
187. See Elhauge, supra note 5, at 763–66.
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shareholders.188 But this ethics exemption does not empower boards to stop
maximizing profits or to stop allocating them to shareholders. Instead, the
exemption does no more than to allow boards to internalize externalities by paying
compensation to victims or by spending on precautions to avoid the harms
entirely.189 That means that the ethical exemption allows boards to manage the firm
to maximize surplus, rather than profits, by taking all of the costs of production
into account in making management decisions, rather than just those costs that the
law happens to charge to firms.190 But the ethical exemption does not establish that,
once surplus has been maximized in this way, the firm need not seek to appropriate
the largest possible share of the surplus for itself as profits or that the firm need
not preserve profits for shareholders.191
So much is clear from the examples of ethical conduct provided by the
American Law Institute (ALI), each of which involves an expenditure by a firm on
a precaution designed to help the firm avoid inflicting an externality on others.192
Spending on product safety, which is the first example, is spending to reduce
externalities if it is to serve as an example of conduct exempt from the requirement
that conduct be profitable. Otherwise, the spending would be profitable, which
would imply that the precaution averts damages that victims could legally charge to
the firm.193 The same is true for the ALI’s second example, steps taken by a firm
to honor promises upon which employees have reasonably relied.194 If keeping
promises is not needed to maximize profits, then workers lack the legal right to
enforce the promises or the ability to factor noncompliance with promises into the
wage rate, which implies that steps taken to honor promises amount to precautions
designed to avoid uncompensated harm to workers.195 Adherence to moral
standards of journalism by a newspaper, which is the ALI’s final example, also
represents the taking of a precaution designed to minimize external harms.196 If
moral journalism is not profit maximizing, and therefore needs an ethics exemption,
then taking steps to introduce morality into journalism must avoid harms of
misinformation that readers would not otherwise be able to charge to

188. This language comes from the American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate
Governance. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 62, §§ 2.01(b)(3), 2.01 cmt. f;
Elhauge, supra note 5, at 763–66. The Principles are not of course binding on the states, but reflect
contemporary views on the duty of care. See id. at 738 (describing the ALI’s Principles as “influential”).
189. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 62, § 2.01 cmt. h. For more
on externalities, see supra note 156 and accompanying text.
190. See VARIAN, supra note 60, at 636.
191. Both of which shareholder primacy requires. See Roe, supra note 52, at 2066–67.
192. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 62, § 2.01 cmt. h.
193. See id.; SHAVELL, supra note 88, at 214–15 (discussing precautions and product safety). This
follows from the definition of an externality as an uncompensated harm. See supra text and sources in
note 156.
194. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 62, § 2.01 cmt. h.
195. See Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and
the “Invisible Handshake,” 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 928 (1985).
196. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 62, § 2.01 cmt. h.
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newspapers.197 Thus, in each of these examples, the firm internalizes an externality
and in none does the firm refuse to maximize profits net of externalities or refuse
to preserve those profits for eventual payment to consumers.
But to prevail in the legal struggle against the shareholder primacy
interpretation of the duty of care, CSR only needs one successful argument.
Fortunately for CSR, one of its arguments against shareholder primacy does stick,
undermining almost all of the shareholder primacy interpretation of corporate law
and establishing not only that boards may pay profits to non-shareholders, but even
that boards have no duty to maximize profits and can choose to charge lower prices
in order to leave more surplus to consumers.198 The argument is that the charitable
exemption to the board’s duty of care, which gives the board authority to give
profits as charity to any group consistent with the public welfare, allows the board
to allocate profits in any amount to virtually any group of non-shareholders.199 The
ALI does suggest that the charitable exemption is subject to a reasonableness
requirement. But that requirement can most plausibly be read not to prevent the
board from paying the firm’s entire profit out to non-shareholders, but only to
prevent the board from going beyond profits in the economic sense to pay
additional value out of the firm to non-shareholders.200 That is, an unreasonable
payment can only be one that pays funds that the firm actually needs to cover costs,
such as the costs of providing shareholders with the minimum reward necessary to
induce them to invest in the firm, out to non-shareholders. All other payment
amounts are reasonable, because reasonableness has no content when applied to
distinguish between magnitudes of profit in the economic sense. All profits are the
same: every penny represents funds that are not needed for the firm to operate
efficiently and which can therefore reasonably be allocated in any amount to
anyone, shareholder or non-shareholder alike.201 Only when a payment exceeds the
amount of a firm’s profits and starts to cut into funds required to cover costs can
a line be coherently drawn between a reasonable and an unreasonable amount of
charitable giving.
At first glance, the charitable giving exemption appears not to go so far as to
undermine the rule that boards must maximize profits, but rather only to go as far
as authorizing boards to pay profits, once maximized at the expense of consumers,
to any non-shareholder group the board may wish to favor.202 CSR, preoccupied

197. The adherence of newspapers to ethical standards is an example of how social norms
induce firms voluntarily to internalize externalities. See Karl-Dieter Opp, Social Networks and the
Emergence of Protest Norms, in SOCIAL NORMS 234, 236 (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp
eds., 2001).
198. For the requirement of shareholder primacy that firms maximize profits and pay profits
to shareholders, see Roe, supra note 52, at 2066–67.
199. See Elhauge, supra note 5, at 763–69; PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra
note 62, § 2.01(b)(3).
200. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 62, § 2.01(b)(3).
201. See supra text and sources in notes 104, 105.
202. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 62, § 2.01(b)(3).
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with the division of profits between firm insiders and largely oblivious to the
consumer interest, has certainly not attempted to push the charitable giving
exemption beyond this boundary.203 But the exemption in fact extends far beyond
it, to authorize boards to choose not to maximize profits and instead to leave
surplus entirely to consumers through the charging of lower prices. A board
interested in allocating surplus to consumers can do so by first charging consumers
the highest possible prices to satisfy the board’s duty to maximize profits, and then
using the charitable giving exemption to pay the profits back to consumers in the
form of cash rebates.204 Indeed, because there is nothing in the law that would
prevent the board from reducing the time between the payment and the rebate to
the smallest time possible, the board could simply refund a customer’s money as
soon as payment takes place at the point of sale. Or the board could stipulate that
as a condition of undertaking any purchase the customer must agree that the
purchase price represents a net price that reflects a higher
profit-maximizing price offset by a rebate. That would allow the board plausibly to
claim to be simultaneously carrying out its duty to maximize profits and exercising
its right to engage in charitable giving to consumers. Thus for all intents and
purposes the charitable exemption swallows the requirement that boards
maximize profits.
Reading the charitable giving exemption to swallow the duty to maximize
profits threatens to violate the old canon of statutory interpretation that requires
that two rules be read to give effect to both.205 But while it is true that the rule
requiring the board to maximize profits, and hence to minimize the share of surplus
available to consumers, would seem to be rendered ineffective by a rule permitting
the board to reallocate profits to consumers, the threat is illusory. The profitmaximization requirement remains meaningful, even when the board redirects
profits to consumers through lower prices, because the profit-maximization
requirement still forces the firm to continue to engage in two activities associated
with profit maximization that do not involve charging consumers the highest
possible prices: the acts of minimizing costs and maximizing product value.206
Without the profit-maximization rule, a firm could choose to allow costs to rise or
product quality to fall, thereby reducing profits, even if the firm intended to

203. See supra Sections I.A, I.B.
204. Consumers are legitimate recipients of corporate charity. The ALI contemplates charitably
giving for the “public welfare, [as well as] humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.” See
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 62, §§ 2.01(b)(3), 2.01(b)(3) cmt. h. Consumers
are the public.
205. See Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co. v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 491 U.S. 490, 510
(1989); William N. Eskridge Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007,
1040–41 (1989).
206. Reducing costs and increasing the value of products to consumers are examples of
“dynamic efficiencies” that are essential to maximizing surplus. See Richard J. Gilbert & Steven
C. Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation
Markets, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 569, 571–74 (1995).
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redistribute any profits the firm would still be able to earn back to consumers after
earning them.207 Although the charitable giving exemption allows boards to charge
low prices and forego extracting surplus from consumers as profits, the exemption
does not absolve boards of the responsibility embodied in the
profit-maximization rule to create the largest possible surplus, the largest possible
potential profits. The profit-maximization rule ensures, in other words, that firms
wishing to direct their profits to consumers nevertheless continue to operate
efficiently, as they would be required to do were they to keep all profits for
shareholders. That hardly amounts to reading all content out of the
profit-maximization requirement in the duty of care.
Thus what CSR has accomplished is to so batter the shareholder primacy
interpretation of the duty of care that today the board has neither a duty to preserve
profits for shareholders nor even a duty to maximize profits, though the board does
still have a duty to operate the firm efficiently. But what CSR has not achieved, and
indeed has not sought, is to read the duty of care to impose an affirmative duty on
boards to minimize profits for the benefit of consumers. Antitrust law, however,
does that.
B. The Antitrust Duty to Minimize Profits
In the middle of the 20th century, courts and enforcers understood the goal
of antitrust law to be the promotion of competition, regardless of the consequences
for distribution or efficiency.208 That changed in the 1970s, when courts started to
embrace a new mission, to maximize the wealth of consumers, that is now the
accepted mission of antitrust law today.209 This new mission, known as the
consumer welfare standard, implies that antitrust law must both maximize surplus
and minimize prices, to ensure that consumers receive the largest surplus
possible.210 In practice, however, courts and enforcers have implemented the new
207. That is, profit maximization forbids firms from engaging in waste, even when firms turn
all of their profits over to consumers. See W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND
ANTITRUST 88–89 (4th ed. 2005) (discussing waste of this kind in the monopoly context).
208. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); Sandeep Vaheesan, The Evolving
Populisms of Antitrust, 93 NEB. L. REV. 370, 386 (2014).
209. See Salop, supra note 29, at 338–47; Vaheesan, supra note 208, at 395–99.
210. It is more commonly said that the goal of antitrust is to protect consumer surplus against
attempts to reduce it below the competitive level. See, e.g., Salop, supra note 29, at 336. But there is no
principled way to carry out that goal other than by striving to maximize consumer surplus. The
consumer welfare standard must be understood to require consumer surplus maximization and profit
minimization, not just maintenance of consumer surplus at the competitive level, because the size of
the surplus enjoyed by consumers under competitive pricing is an arbitrary function of a firm’s marginal
costs. See FRIED, supra note 42, at 134 (observing that the “actual incidence of rents” depends on the
“shape of the cost curve”). If marginal costs rise slowly for low levels of output and then spike, while
demand is relatively elastic, then consumer surplus at the competitive price will be low relative to
profits. (To see why consumer surplus can be very low at the competitive price, consider the following
example. Suppose that the cost of producing a first unit of output is $1.00, the cost of producing a
second unit is $10.00, and the cost of producing a third unit is $12.00. Suppose further that consumers
uniformly place a value of $10.02 per unit on the output. Then at the competitive price of $10.01 per
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mission only by reducing the vigor with which they condemn anticompetitive
practices, to ensure that excessive competition does not prevent firms from
covering the fixed costs, including costs of innovation, required for firms to
maximize surplus by producing the best possible products.211 But courts and
enforcers have done nothing to prevent this enervation of antitrust law from
allowing firms to raise prices above costs and thereby to deny consumers the largest
possible share of the enlarged surplus that the weakening of antitrust enforcement
has been allowing firms to generate.212
For example, to ensure that firms can pay the costs of being the best, antitrust
law today does not prohibit the sale of superior products under any circumstances,
a policy that allows some firms to appropriate the surplus generated by those
products for themselves.213 Sellers of superior products have the power to charge
high prices for them because competitors, lacking equally appealing offerings,
cannot lure consumers away from the superior products, even by charging lower
prices.214 High prices for superior products are no problem from the perspective of
consumer welfare so long as sellers need the high prices to cover costs, particularly
the costs of research and development required to create superior products.215 But
if the prices sellers charge are higher than necessary to cover costs—and there is no
reason to suppose that the power created by the sale of a superior product magically
ends as soon as prices rise above costs—sellers deny consumers access to a portion
of the surplus generated by superior products.216 A superior-product seller’s ability
to extract surplus from consumers through above-cost pricing conflicts with
unit, the firm will produce and sell two units and generate $9.02 of profit. Consumer surplus, by
contrast, will be a vanishingly-small $0.02.) In such a circumstance competition itself offers little
protection for consumers. A standard that puts consumer welfare first must do better than competitive
pricing, at least when firms are constrained to charge uniform prices. (When firms are not constrained
to charge uniform prices, as is increasingly the case in the information age, competition should drive
prices down to costs, and thereby maximize consumer surplus, eliminating the distinction between
protecting the competitive level of consumer surplus and maximizing consumer surplus. See infra
Section II.D. The fact that the two interpretations of the consumer welfare standard are converging for
technological reasons on consumer surplus maximization is itself an independent reason to understand
consumer surplus maximization as the true goal of the consumer welfare standard.) The focus on the
distribution that prevails at the competitive price is a relic of the days when antitrust’s goal was the
promotion of competition, rather than consumer welfare. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
The interpretation of the consumer welfare standard as requiring the maximization of consumer surplus
has been endorsed by other scholars. See C. Scott Hemphill, Less Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust
Law, COLUM. L. REV. 975–76 (2016) (suggesting that the alternative would lead to absurd results);
Aaron Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference: Theory and Practice, 67 RUTGERS L. REV. 585, 609 (2015)
(assuming a maximization standard in evaluating reverse payment patent settlements). On an unrelated
note, there is sometimes a trade-off between price minimization and surplus maximization, the
consequences of which for an antitrust duty to minimize profits are discussed in Section II.D.
211. See Woodcock, supra note 14, at 1758–60.
212. See id. at 1759–60.
213. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966); United States
v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
214. See Demsetz, supra note 80, at 2.
215. See supra Section I.C.1.
216. See Woodcock, supra note 14, at 1759–60; Woodcock, supra note 12, at 126–36.
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antitrust’s goal of maximizing consumer surplus, but today antitrust refuses to do
anything about the conflict.217
The same is true when competitors collaborate to produce superior products
through research and development joint ventures, or when a firm imposes
restrictions on retailers or suppliers designed to improve the end product delivered
down through the supply chain to consumers.218 Antitrust today permits these
activities, when in mid-century it would not, on the theory that these activities
improve product quality and therefore the size of the surplus that firms can generate
for consumers.219 But antitrust does not step in when firms abuse the power that
the resulting product improvements confer on them to raise prices and keep the
extra
surplus
they
generate
through
product
improvements
220
for themselves.
Antitrust must do more to remain faithful to its mission of maximizing
consumer surplus, by imposing a duty on businesses to choose prices to minimize
profits.221 That is, antitrust must impose on firms a duty to price at economic cost,
where cost is defined as the lowest price that makes a firm ready, willing, and able
to produce in quantities and ways that maximize the surplus that the firm
generates.222 Only in that way will firms both operate efficiently in the sense of
maximizing surplus and ensure that consumers enjoy all of the surplus generated by
217. See Ramsi A. Woodcock, The Obsolescence of Advertising in the Information Age, 127 YALE
L.J. 2270, 2311–12 (2018). For antitrust’s goal of maximizing consumer surplus, see sources cited supra
note 210.
218. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 106, at 222–31, 412–20, 478–84, 498–505.
219. Under the prevailing “rule of reason” standard of review, these practices all escape
condemnation so long as they are essential to the creation of efficiencies, such as product
improvements. See Hemphill, supra note 210, at 937–39 (discussing least restrictive alternatives analysis
and the rule of reason). Courts almost never condemn vertical mergers, for example, particularly when
they lead to efficiencies. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 106, at 430. Courts treat exclusive dealing, a soft
form of vertical integration, with less severity than they did in the 1970s, particularly when efficiencies
can be shown. See id. at 484–86. And the courts have done away with bans on restrictions imposed by
manufacturers on their distributors, approving of such restrictions when efficiencies can be shown. See
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 900–03, 906–08 (2007). Courts also
allow research and development joint ventures when efficiencies can be shown. See HOVENKAMP, supra
note 106, at 222–28.
220. Under the prevailing least-restrictive-alternatives interpretation of the rule of reason, a
practice that both increases surplus and leads to above-cost pricing that appropriates part of the surplus
for firms violates the law only if there is a way to achieve the same increase in surplus without conferring
on firms so much market power as to permit firms to charge above-cost prices. See Hemphill, supra
note 210, at 937–39. But short of forcing firms to share their superior products with competitors, which
can lead to cost increases due to a loss of economies of scale, or excessive competition and below-cost
pricing that ultimately reduce surplus, there is rarely a way to limit the power of firms that undertake
vertical or horizontal restrictions for purposes of producing superior products. See Woodcock, supra
note 12, at 161–62 (discussing the impossible lengths to which antitrust would need to go to restructure
industries in order to ensure that competition leads to at-cost prices); HOVENKAMP, supra note 106, at
321–22. The only solution to this problem, and the one advocated in this Section, is to read the
consumer welfare standard to ask firms not to exercise their market power, by choosing to charge
at-cost prices and thereby to minimize their profits.
221. See Woodcock, supra note 14, at 1770–71.
222. See id.
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firms. To avoid putting the courts in the position of setting prices, this duty would
be enforceable with nominal damages alone, and would influence behavior primarily
by drawing the attention of the public to high prices and by prevailing on the sense
of duty of firms to follow the law.223 This approach, which I defend in detail in
another article, would exert pressure on all firms to comply with the antitrust goal
of maximizing consumer surplus but would avoid driving prices below costs, by
allowing firms to pay nominal damages and pursue their preferred pricing policies
if they believe that judges are failing to measure their costs correctly.224

223. See id. at 1770–74. By pegging the price a firm may charge to the firm’s actual costs, a duty
to minimize profits avoids all of the problems faced by rate regulators in choosing regulated rates. See
VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 59, at 539–54 (discussing the shortcomings of rate of return regulation,
among many other forms of price regulation). A duty to minimize profits can do that, however, only
because it relies upon the good faith of firms in identifying their own costs and charging prices equal
to them. For the Legalism of administrative rate regulation, an antitrust duty to minimize profits
therefore substitutes the Confucianism of a duty that is not meaningfully punishable at law. See
NEEDHAM, supra note 37, at 312 (“The Legalists laid all their emphasis on positive law . . . . As against
this the Confucians [thought that] right behavior [should] be taught, rather than enforced, by
paternalistic magistrates.”).
224. See Woodcock, supra note 14, at 1774–77. Imposing restrictions on prices, without
requiring that firms strive to maximize product value, might be thought to create an incentive for firms
to reduce costs by degrading product quality in order to recapture profits lost due to the pricing
restrictions. See David E. M. Sappington, Regulating Service Quality: A Survey, 27 J. REG. ECON. 123,
130–31 (2005). Firms are unlikely to degrade quality in response to a profit-minimization duty,
however, because the duty requires that firms price at cost, so any cost reductions created by degrading
quality would force the firm to reduce price further, preventing the firm from capturing any profits.
More importantly, the weakness of the sanction for violating the duty to minimize profits, which
sanction would be the payment of nominal damages, means that firms wishing to avoid the duty to
minimize profits would not need to resort to quality degradation, but could simply ignore the duty and
continue to charge above-cost prices. See Woodcock, supra note 14, at 1770–74.
The social obloquy associated with a firm’s insistence on charging higher prices in the teeth of a
federal judgment indicating that the prices are too high might itself be treated as a cost of the firm, one
that might induce the firm to acquiesce in the charging of lower prices even when the court has made
a mistake and lower prices are inefficient. Reputational damage is best treated not as a cost, however,
but as a reduction in demand for a firm’s products. To the extent that a firm’s defiance of a court’s
decision that prices are too high harms the firm, it is because the court’s decision induces some
consumers to reduce demand for the product. Such reductions might in fact cause the firm to acquiesce
in the charging of low prices, but the fact that this acquiescence would be caused by a change in demand
makes it difficult to view the low prices as really inefficient after all. For the efficiency of charging
higher prices lies in the higher prices’ ability to stimulate investment that increases product quality and
consumer demand. If consumer demand instead falls when higher prices are charged—even if only as
a result of the information provided to consumers by the judicial decision—one must conclude that
consumer assessments of the product offered to them have changed and any improvements to the
product arising from the higher prices are no longer as attractive to consumers, given the higher prices,
as they initially appeared to be.
That is, in order for a judge’s incorrect decision to prevent a firm from continuing to charge high
prices, consumers must accept the judge’s incorrect decision as correct. But in a free enterprise system
built on the worship of consumer sovereignty, the decision of consumers to accept the judge’s decision
as correct, particularly given the opportunity of the firm to make its own case directly to consumers
regarding the fairness of the prices that the firm charges, must be considered authoritative. See
Woodcock, supra note 217, at 2334–36 (discussing the consumer sovereignty foundations of the free
market system). The only exception would be if the court’s incorrect decision has not merely
informational, but manipulative, effects upon consumer decision-making processes, something that is
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Were antitrust to recognize such a duty to choose a
consumer-surplus-maximizing, profit-minimizing price, the consequences for the
debate over corporate mission would be profound. Antitrust law has always
imposed on management, as a matter of federal law, which is superior to all state
corporate law regimes, the duty to run the firm without engaging in certain
anticompetitive practices, such as price fixing, that might give the firm the power
to raise prices and redistribute surplus to itself in the form of higher profits.225
Under my proposed duty to minimize profits, antitrust law would now also require
that firms choose prices equal to their costs, to the end of maximizing consumer
surplus and therefore minimizing profit.226 That is, if antitrust law’s consumer
welfare mission is taken seriously and a duty to price at cost is imposed, then profit
maximization would become illegal, and punishable by nominal damages under the
law and general opprobrium in the court of public opinion.227
In this way, antitrust would resolve the long-running debate over corporate
mission. Because, if firms do not generate profits, there is no question which
constituent of the firm is entitled to a firm’s profits.228 The answer is: none. Because
there should be no profits. All of the surplus generated by the firm’s productive
activities should go to consumers, not shareholders, managers, or workers. This
does not mean, however, that non-consumer contributors to the firm would
abandon their posts or work less hard. The firm could still pay these other
contributors their costs, defined as the minimum that would be required to make
them contribute with alacrity.229 There would also still be shareholders and a
possibility of dividends. To the extent that dividends would be necessary to
encourage equity investment, the dividends would count as costs, not profits, and
so the firm could still pay them out.230 The firm would also be allowed to continue
difficult to credit given the decidedly unseductive way in which courts publicize their decisions. See
id. at 2314 (discussing the inefficiency of manipulative advertising).
In other words: given that the remedy is nominal damages, the decision of the court that a price
is too high serves no purpose other than to help consumers reach their own independent judgment
regarding whether that price is too high. As such, any effect of an erroneous decision by the court upon
the firm must run through consumers, but because in the free market system consumers are the ultimate
authority regarding what is and is not a fair price, a judge’s error can never adversely affect a firm. See
id. at 2334–36. In a system that recognizes consumer sovereignty, the buck stops with consumers, and
their decisions, unless the result of manipulation, must always be treated as correct and indeed efficient.
See id. at 2314.
225. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 596–97, 607–10 (2003)
(discussing antitrust supremacy); HOVENKAMP, supra note 106, at 158–59 (discussing price fixing).
226. See Woodcock, supra note 14, at 1770–71.
227. See id.
228. For a discussion of why the corporate mission debate amounts to a debate about which
group should get the firm’s profit, see supra Section I.A.
229. For the distinction between cost and profit, see supra Section I.C.1.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 100, 107. The continuing ability of corporations to pay
shareholders the dividends required to induce investment ensures that under my proposed duty to
minimize profits the distinction between for-profit and non-profit corporations would remain.
For-profit corporations would continue to be authorized to pay dividends or make other cash
distributions to shareholders, so long as the distributions would be necessary to attract investment.
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to pay any costs that the firm might need to incur on an ad hoc basis in order to
reward teamwork by managers or workers, because those are costs that must be
incurred for the firm to produce efficiently, and therefore do not count as profits.
The teamwork concerns of CSR could therefore still be taken into account.231 The
firm would also still be able to spend the firm’s quasi-profits in whatever ways
necessary to maximize surplus, because such expenditures count as costs.232 The
only difference is that now the firm would also need to charge low prices to ensure
that consumers take all of what is left over after costs are covered.
My proposed antitrust rule, that boards have a duty to minimize profits and
by extension to maximize consumer surplus, would not displace current antitrust
limits on anticompetitive conduct, such as the rule against price fixing, but would
add to the law’s kit for maximizing consumer surplus a new, complementary, tool.233
That tool would permit the law to discourage firms from charging above-cost prices
in situations in which traditional antitrust rules are toothless, such as in the case of
sale of a superior product. As already described, in that case traditional antitrust
prohibitions on anticompetitive conduct are inappropriate because the
anticompetitive conduct—the act of fielding a competitive product—is actually
good for consumers.234 When firms achieve power to raise prices by means
prohibited by traditional antitrust prohibitions on anticompetitive conduct,
enforcers could still bring cases based upon those prohibitions, and could still seek
associated remedies directed at bringing prices down through
increased competition.235
Whereas non-profit corporations would continue to be prohibited from declaring dividends or
otherwise distributing to investors any funds remaining after creditors are paid. See 1 WILLIAM MEADE
FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 68.05 (2012) (stating that a
“nonprofit corporation is prohibited from having or issuing shares of stock, paying dividends or
distributing any part of its income to its members, directors or officers, except reasonable
compensation for services rendered”); MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION ACT § 14.05(d) (AM. BAR
ASS’N, 2008) (barring any member or affiliate of a charitable corporation from receiving a distribution
upon dissolution other than as payment for services rendered).
231. See supra text accompanying note 162.
232. See supra text accompanying note 109.
233. For an overview of current limits on anticompetitive conduct, see RICHARD A. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW 33–43 (2d ed. 2001).
234. See Woodcock, supra note 217, at 2309–14 (discussing “innovation primacy” in antitrust
law). Fielding a superior product is anticompetitive because doing so drives sellers of inferior products
from the market. See id. at 2309. But fielding a superior product is nevertheless good for consumers
relative to the alternative of having a competitive market of inferior products and no superior product
at all. See id. at 2312. Traditional antitrust remedies seek to restore competition to the market, but in the
case of competition harmed by the fielding of a superior product, that can be done only by suppressing
the product, with attendant harm to consumers, or forcing the seller to share the product with
competitors, which can lead either to higher costs due to the loss of economies of scale, or to excessive
competition that drives prices below the levels required by the seller to recoup innovation costs, chilling
innovation in the long run. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 106, at 321–22, 339–40; cf. Woodcock, supra
note 12, at 154–55, 158–59. A duty to minimize profits avoids the dangers of competition-based
remedies in this context.
235. See POSNER, supra note 233, at 33–48 (providing an overview of traditional antitrust rules
and remedies).
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My proposed duty to minimize profits would greatly advance the cause of
efficiency, even in these more traditional cases. That is because competition is a
wasteful enterprise, requiring markets to support duplicative operations, many of
which will ultimately fail.236 Competition can lead to innovation, and when that
occurs the gains often more than justify the costs. But in cases in which the primary
purpose of promoting competition is to keep prices low, and many traditional
antitrust cases have this character, imposing a rule of profit minimization, if the rule
is in fact honored in practice, would generally be less wasteful than encouraging new
firms to organize and enter the market in the hope that competition between them
will eventually lead to lower prices.237 My proposed profit-minimization rule would
be available to enforcers in such cases as an alternative to the pursuit of traditional
antitrust remedies aimed at promoting competition.
None other than the great case of Dodge v. Ford, over which shareholder
primacy advocates and CSR have done battle for decades because of the Michigan
Supreme Court’s explicit endorsement of shareholder primacy therein, actually
serves to illustrate by omission the advantages of my proposed profit-minimization
duty over policies focused solely on the promotion of competition.238 Dodge v. Ford
was a crypto-antitrust case. The Dodge brothers, shareholders in Ford, wanted to
use their Ford dividends to cover the costs of creating a new car company to rival
Ford.239 The great inventor of the Model T responded by cutting prices right down
to costs and using the corresponding drop in profits to reduce the dividend to the
bare minimum required to pay the cost of capital, starving the Dodges of
financing.240 But if Ford had been successful, he could not possibly have harmed
consumers, because Ford did exactly what an antirust duty to minimize profits
would require: he charged prices no higher than necessary to cover costs,
minimizing the firm’s profits and maximizing consumer surplus.241

236. See SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 100, at 97–102.
237. For the gains of innovation usually exceeding the costs, see Woodcock, supra note 217, at
2313 nn.200–01.
238. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 683–84 (Mich. 1919); STOUT, supra note 5,
at 24–27; Smith, supra note 170, at 315, 315 n.186.
239. See Rock, supra note 15, at 520–22.
240. See id. To be precise, Ford cut the price of the Model T by enough to reduce annual
accounting profits by two thirds, and planned to plough the company’s existing cash hoard of nearly
$60 million into constructing new production plants needed to serve the increased demand created by
the lower prices. See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 671–72. If the remaining annual one third of accounting profits
may be supposed to have been needed to cover research and development costs, to insure Ford against
business uncertainty, and the like, then Ford cut prices down to costs in the economic sense. See supra
Section I.C.1. The one third of accounting profits would also no doubt have been used in part to pay
the “regular” annual dividend of 5%, which Ford retained, but that dividend must be understood to
constitute the cost of capital: the bare minimum Ford would need to pay to satisfy the expectations of
investors and ensure that Ford would be able to tap equity markets in the future if need be. See Dodge,
170 N.W. at 671; cf. Greenwood, supra note 62, at 123 (arguing that there is no cost of equity capital
because corporations have no legal duty to use dividends to compensate shareholders for the money
they invest in corporations).
241. See supra text accompanying note 222.

First to Printer_Woodcock.docx (Do Not Delete)

1440

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

6/10/20 9:12 PM

[Vol. 10:1395

The only way Ford’s choice to harm competition by starving the Dodges could
have harmed consumers is if Ford had prevented the Dodges from bringing
additional innovation to the market, because innovative products increase consumer
surplus. In the event, Dodge and the many other brands that followed Ford into
the car market did not bring innovation, and a case can be made that Ford, which
built more reliable cars and sold them at reasonable prices, actually went on to
become a victim of a style of marketing-based competition involving flashy but
shoddily-crafted vehicles that ultimately reduced the level of innovation in the car
market, leaving the market vulnerable, decades later, to better-quality imports from
Europe and Asia.242 If the court’s goal in ordering Ford to pay the dividend was to
induce competition that would do no more than keep prices low, the court should
have ruled for Ford, which was already charging low prices, to the great benefit of
consumers, and spared the waste involved in assembling a whole new car company
in order to achieve the same result.243 If the court had taken that approach, the court
would have had no need to recognize a shareholder right to dividends or deliver the
endorsement of shareholder primacy for which the case is known today.
An entire generation of economists and corporate law scholars have spent
their careers trying to shore up shareholder primacy by finding ways to ensure that
managers maximize profits, despite the obvious conflict of interest associated with
managers’ duty under shareholder primacy to turn those profits over to
shareholders.244 Were the courts to recognize an antitrust duty to minimize profits,
this agency problem would remain, but now it would be consumers, rather than
shareholders, for whom managers would need to be made to work effectively. The
challenges policymakers face in resolving both agency problems are similar.
Consumers, like shareholders, are often numerous and their ability to organize to
monitor managers is limited.245 Consumers, like shareholders, often also have only
a short-term relationship with the firm, or one that involves only a small financial
interest, making consumers unwilling individually to invest the resources necessary
to supervise managers.246 Consumers, like shareholders, often influence the firm
242. See F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRY STRUCTURE, STRATEGY AND PUBLIC POLICY 283–85,
291–95, 322 (1996) (discussing the use of annual model changes as a marketing method in the car
industry, as well as the quality-based success of Japanese imports). The Dodges in fact initially argued
that Ford had violated the antitrust laws, but a lower court rejected the claim. See Rock, supra note 15,
at 522.
243. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 685.
244. See generally David E. M. Sappington, Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships,
J. ECON. PERSP. 45 (1991) (discussing work by economists on the principal-agent problem and noting
connections to corporate governance); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 8–10 (1998) (discussing legal arrangements that reduce
agency costs). For more on the agency problem, see supra Section I.C.2.a.
245. See Bainbridge, supra note 170, at 613 (observing that shareholders have a “collective
action” problem).
246. See Henry Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 267, 283 (1988)
(observing that the smallness of corporate investors is an obstacle to monitoring boards); Ronald
M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of Corporate Governance, 50 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1409, 1414 (1993).
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only by making purchase and sale decisions.247 But in some respects the consumer
agency problem differs from the shareholder agency problem. Unlike shareholders,
who have the right to vote to remove the board, corporate law gives consumers no
direct authority at all over management.248 Consumers would have a compensating
advantage under my proposed duty to minimize profits, however, one that
shareholders lack in their own efforts to control managers: two enforcement
agencies that would be able to sue to vindicate consumers’ right to low prices.249
One striking result of a duty to minimize profits would be the prohibition, as
a general matter, of the extraction of rent in the traditional economic sense.250 Rent
is the profit generated by a seller who rations access to a good that is in limited
supply by raising prices.251 Consider the classic example of land.252 The supply of
land is fixed, and the cost of land is zero, since no one produces land, it is just
there.253 But at a price equal to this cost of zero, there are likely to be many more
prospective buyers of land than there are available parcels, forcing landowners to
devise a way of deciding which prospective buyers should be allowed to buy.254 By
charging high prices for their land, landowners can drive some buyers from the
market and thereby ration access to their land to those having the highest willingness
to pay for it.255 But because the ration prices charged by landowners are necessarily
above the landowners’ costs, they generate profits at those market-clearing prices.256
Those profits are rents.257 An antitrust duty to minimize profits would require
landowners to use any other equally efficient means available to them to identify
the buyer who places the highest value on the land and then to charge that buyer

247. See Hansmann, supra note 246, at 283 (expressing skepticism that the market for corporate
control allows shareholders to discipline managers); Green, supra note 246, at 1414 (noting that
shareholders can sell their shares at any time).
248. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT, supra note 170, § 8.08 (describing
the default right of shareholders to vote to remove directors); Strine, Jr., supra note 5, at 766
(emphasizing that the voting rights of shareholders give them the power to compel managers to
maximize shareholder wealth).
249. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 106, at 642–45 (discussing the enforcement roles of the
Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice). Consumers may
also sue firms directly to enforce the antitrust laws. See id. at 667.
250. See VARIAN, supra note 60, at 412–13 (defining economic rent).
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. See id. at 7 (considering what happens when price is so low that demand exceeds supply).
255. See id. at 8. It is no objection that the cost of the land is in fact this ration price because
this ration price can be obtained for sure from the market, and therefore a sale at any lower price would
have the ration price as an opportunity cost. See FRIED, supra note 42, at 120 (discussing the view that
land rents are “a true cost of production”). The ration price is here the variable to be chosen.
Opportunity cost enters into the question only as the alternative value the seller could get from the land
were the seller not to sell the land on this particular market (i.e., into this particular demand curve).
Cf. VARIAN, supra note 60, at 413. By assumption, that cost is zero.
256. See VARIAN, supra note 60, at 412–13.
257. See id.
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the zero price that equals the landowner’s cost of producing the land.258 Only in
that way would a landowner, if a corporation, comply with its duty to maximize
surplus by selling to the buyer who places the greatest value on the land, but at the
same time minimize profits by charging the buyer the lowest possible price.
C. Antitrust Preemption of Corporate Law
My proposed antitrust duty to minimize profits would be grounded in section
2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolization.259 As federal antitrust law,
the duty would preempt any duty of the board under state corporate law to
maximize profits for the benefit of shareholders, because the Supremacy Clause of
the U.S. Constitution preempts state law that conflicts with federal law.260 The
courts have applied preemption sparingly in the antitrust context, preempting state
law only when the conduct authorized by the particular state law in question always
violates federal antitrust law.261 But any state corporate law grant of authority to
boards to maximize profits or pay profits to anyone other than consumers would
meet that preemption standard were courts to read a duty to minimize profits into
antitrust law, because profit maximization necessarily always violates a rule
requiring profit minimization.
The fact that an antitrust duty to minimize profits would preempt state
corporate law rules regarding the duty of care does not actually settle the question
whether an antitrust profit-minimization duty could be enforced in contravention
of state laws, because the courts have read the antitrust laws to confer immunity

258. See Ramsi A. Woodcock, The Efficient Queue and the Case Against Dynamic Pricing, 105
IOWA L. REV. 1759, 1784–93 (2020) (arguing that in the information age many efficient alternatives to
rationing with price now exist). True, landowners would at first be able to recoup the prices they paid
in purchasing their land, which prices would count as fixed costs and therefore be chargeable to buyers
under a duty to minimize profits. See supra Section I.C.1. But because a duty to minimize profits would
only permit landowners to add to that amount the slightest sliver of additional profit as an incentive to
transfer their land to the buyer who places the greatest value upon it, landowners would not be able to
capture most of the appreciation in value associated with their land, and over time that would cause the
passed-along cost—the dead hand of the world that existed before the arrival of the profit minimization
duty—to decline into insignificance and eventually vanish entirely. See id.
259. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018); Woodcock, supra note 14, at 1770–71.
260. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2. The courts recognize three kinds of exercise of Supremacy Clause
power: (1) express invalidation of state law, as when a federal statute declares a particular state law void;
(2) invalidation implied by pervasive federal regulation of a particular field of law, as when a federal law
that regulates every aspect of the design of a particular piece of equipment precludes state regulators
from imposing their own design standards; and (3) invalidation implied by the existence of a conflict
between a federal law and a state law, as when a state law would prevent the federal government from
achieving its purposes in adopting a particular federal law. See Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., NA
v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996); Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 565 U.S. 625, 630–31 (2012).
Because the antitrust laws were intended to supplement state laws, they trigger neither explicit nor field
preemption. See Richard Squire, Antitrust and the Supremacy Clause, 59 STAN. L. REV. 77, 101 (2006)
(sources cited therein). The antitrust laws can therefore preempt state laws only when the two conflict.
See id. The rules discussed in this Section determine when antitrust law and state law are considered to
be in conflict, permitting antitrust law to displace state law.
261. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 106, at 794–95 (sources cited therein).
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from preemption on state rules that are part of an industrial policy that is actively
being implemented by the state.262 The key factor that determines whether a state
rule benefits from this “state-action” immunity is whether the state’s bureaucracy
actively supervises implementation of the rule at issue.263 If not, and if in particular
the rule appears intended to do no more than give a state imprimatur of legality to
essentially private anticompetitive conduct, then immunity does not apply and the
rule is preempted.264 For example, in California Retail Liquor Dealers v. Midcal
Aluminum, the Court refused to grant immunity to a state law regime that authorized
firms to engage in resale price maintenance because the state
neither establishes prices nor reviews the reasonableness of the price
schedules . . . . The State does not monitor market conditions or engage in
any “pointed reexamination” of the program. The national policy in favor
of competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak of state
involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement.265
By allowing firms to choose their own above-cost prices and profit levels,
state corporate law regimes today authorize precisely this kind of unsupervised
private conduct, conduct that would necessarily violate an antitrust duty to minimize
profits. State regulators engage in no active supervision of corporate governance,
often lacking authority even to reject the filing of a corporate charter on the ground
that it does not conform to law, let alone to engage in regulation of corporate pricing
decisions.266 Although the courts do sometimes regulate board compliance with the
duty of care, board pricing decisions are subject to the business judgment rule,
pursuant to which courts allow firms almost unlimited discretion in their
decision-making.267 State corporate law regimes are identical to the regime in Midcal,
quoted above, except that unlike the regime in Midcal, state corporate law regimes
do not even require firms to report the prices they charge, or the profits they

262. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 102–05 (1980);
HOVENKAMP, supra note 106, at 794. This is known as “state action” immunity from the federal
antitrust laws. See id. at 797.
263. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351–52 (1943); HOVENKAMP, supra note 106, at 800,
805–10.
264. Immunity requires not only active supervision of the otherwise illegal conduct, but also
clear authorization of the conduct by the relevant state law. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 106, at 800.
This clear-authorization requirement mandates that the authorization be rooted in statute, rather than
in regulations issued by state administrative agencies, in order for the authorization to qualify for
immunity. See id. at 801–02. For purposes of argument, I assume that state corporate law statutes create
the requisite clear authorization for boards to charge above-cost prices in violation of an antitrust duty
to minimize profits. The failure of that assumption would provide additional grounds for implementing
federal preemption of state corporate law with respect to the distribution of the surplus by firms.
265. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n, 445 U.S. at 105–06.
266. See 1A FLETCHER, supra note 230, § 159 (discussing the inability of the Secretary of State
in “many jurisdictions” to reject the filing of a corporate charter).
267. See Gevurtz, supra note 170, at 295–303 (providing three formulations of the rule for which
at most the board’s subjective belief that its actions are in the best interests of the corporation plus
some minimum level of process in making decisions are required for immunity under the rule).
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generate, to the state, making supervision impossible.268 State action immunity does
not apply, and my proposed antitrust duty to minimize profits would therefore
preempt state corporate law rules regarding the maximization and distribution
of profits.
D. Efficiency Concerns
For a duty to minimize profits to be efficient, the rule must require that firms
maximize surplus as part of the process of turning surplus over to consumers,
because lower surplus reflects less efficient operations. This presents a problem for
the use of antitrust law’s consumer welfare standard as the basis for imposing a
profit minimization duty on firms, because antitrust law’s consumer welfare
standard does not take efficiency into account. The standard requires that firms
pursue maximization of consumer surplus even when doing so would reduce overall
surplus and therefore efficiency.269 Thus unlike both shareholder primacy advocates
and CSR advocates, who argue that their favored distributions of wealth are
efficient, the antitrust laws themselves throw efficiency to the winds and favor
consumers no matter what the consequences for efficiency, albeit with the
understanding that what maximizes consumer surplus usually maximizes total
surplus too.270 By contrast, an efficient duty to minimize profits can insist upon
profit minimization only when profit minimization does not reduce surplus,
because efficiency means the maximization surplus.271 In general, the two standards,
antitrust law’s consumer welfare standard, which puts maximization of consumer
surplus first, and the true profit-minimization standard that puts efficiency first,
will dictate the same firm behaviors.272 But in two important cases they do not, and
in those cases literal application of the consumer welfare standard would sacrifice
efficiency for distribution.
The first case in which application of antitrust law’s consumer welfare
standard can be inefficient arises when a firm inflicts externalities: harms for which
the firm does not pay compensation.273 Boards that elect to pay compensation to
victims, including victims who have no legal right to compensation, will operate
their firms efficiently, because they will take all of the costs associated with
production into account in making decisions, and so when they act to maximize

268. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n, 445 U.S. at 99.
269. For the efficiency of profit minimization, see supra Sections I.C.1, I.C.2.a, II.B. For the
consumer welfare standard, see Salop, supra note 29, at 336.
270. See id. For the appeals of advocates of shareholder primacy and CSR to efficiency, see supra
Section I.B.
271. Part I established that the distribution of surplus and surplus maximization are analytically
separate problems. That remains true. But as will become clear in this Section, law or technology may
limit a firm’s ability to achieve a particular desired distribution of the surplus created by the firm. When
that is the case, the solution is not to effectuate redistribution anyway by sacrificing surplus, but to alter
the law or improve the technology.
272. See Baker, supra note 85, at 516.
273. For more on uncompensated harms, see text accompanying note 155.
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profits they will maximize surplus as well.274 Consistent with this efficiency
rationale, corporate law permits—though does not require—boards to pay
compensation for harms that the firm is not legally required to compensate, even if
doing so reduces profits.275 Antitrust law, however, has traditionally had little
tolerance for the charging of higher prices in order to provide compensation for
externalities. A firm cannot, for example, defend against the claim that it has
engaged in price fixing in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act by arguing that
the firm needed to fix higher prices in order to generate revenues with which to
compensate victims of the firm who would not be able to obtain redress in court.276
By enabling the firm more fully to take the costs of its productive activities into
account, such price fixing might actually result in more efficient production by the
firm, but the consumer welfare standard requires that enforcers put the interests of
consumers before efficiency.277
If the courts were to impose an antitrust duty on boards to minimize profits,
that duty, too, would ignore the problem of externalities, and require firms to reduce
prices even when higher prices would be required to provide compensation for
externalities.278 Firms would effectively be prohibited from internalizing
externalities, and so their production decisions would tend not to maximize surplus,
an inefficient result.279 Consider, for example, a firm that must choose between
creating a good worth $10.00 to consumers at a cost of $3.00 in harm to others and
creating a good worth $10.00 to consumers at a cost of $2.00 in harm to others. The
profit-minimizing firm should create the $2.00 good and sell it at a price of $2.00,
because that maximizes surplus at $8.00 and turns all of that surplus over to
consumers through the charging of an at-cost price. But if the $3.00 in harm is not
compensable at law, while the $2.00 is compensable, the consumer welfare standard
would require that the firm create the $3.00 good, because the absence of a duty to
compensate for the harm would allow the firm to give the good away for free,
conferring a full $10.00 of value on consumers, $2.00 more than if the firm were to
create the $2.00 good. The result is a reduction in surplus from $8.00 to $7.00,
because externalities are genuine harms, and therefore reduce surplus, even if
neither firms nor consumers are required to pay compensation for them. While
existing antitrust practice supports this result, there is no reason for which the courts
could not change the consumer welfare standard to require that consumer surplus
be calculated net of all costs, including reasonably calculable and identifiable

274. See VARIAN, supra note 60, at 632–37.
275. See supra Section II.A.
276. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018). That is, I am aware of no court that has recognized a “covering the
cost of externalities” antitrust defense. See Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market
Failures, Total Welfare, and the Challenge of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 MICH. L. REV. 849,
879–82 (2000) (calling for recognition of such a “market failure” defense).
277. See Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 68, at 240–41.
278. Cf. Hammer, supra note 276, at 879–82.
279. See VARIAN, supra note 60, at 632–37. For the importance of taking all harms of production
into account in determining surplus, see supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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externalities.280 That would permit defendants to escape liability for charging higher
prices by showing that since the higher prices were needed to provide compensation
for externalities, the defendants did not actually reduce consumer surplus, properly
calculated net of all harms, both those for which the law requires compensation and
those for which the law does not require compensation.281
Using antitrust law’s consumer welfare standard as the basis for a duty to
minimize profits would also lead to inefficiency when firms lack the technical
capacity properly to charge at-cost prices. Recall that for a firm to have an incentive
to maximize surplus while still minimizing profits, the firm must charge prices that
extract from consumers a constant, but small, percentage of the surplus generated
by the firm.282 That ensures that the firm’s own welfare is tied to the size of the
surplus the firm generates.283 But charging a price that extracts a constant
percentage of the surplus generated by each unit the firm sells requires knowledge
of the value that each consumer places on each unit that the consumer buys, because
surplus is the difference between the value a consumer places on a product and the
product’s costs of production.284 Firms do not have perfect information about
consumers’ product valuations, however, and so they may be unable to identify the
low prices they would need to charge to minimize profits without sacrificing
efficiency. In that case, an efficient profit-minimization rule would require that
firms default to charging the lowest prices that firms know will not harm efficiency.
But the consumer welfare standard does not put efficiency first in this way. Instead,
the consumer welfare standard would require that firms charge prices that maximize
the value enjoyed by consumers, even if doing so would reduce overall surplus and
therefore be inefficient.
Consider, for example, the firm that knows so little about the value each of its
customers places on the firm’s products that the firm has no basis for charging
different prices to its customers and must therefore charge the same price to each
of them. In this case, the only price that the firm can charge that is consistent with
280. See Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 68, at 240–41; Hammer, supra note 276, at 879–82.
281. See Hammer, supra note 276, at 879–82.
282. See supra Section I.C.1.
283. See id.
284. For more on surplus, see supra notes 59, 158. The fact that firms may never be able to
obtain perfect information about consumers’ product valuations does not make profit minimization
unworkable as a general matter, any more than imperfect information makes the project of profit
maximization that firms pursue today unworkable. See Woodcock, Personalized Pricing as
Monopolization, supra note 122, at 319–20. In order to maximize profits, firms must know the value
that each consumer places on each unit that the consumer buys, in order to charge the highest possible
prices to each consumer for each unit. See id. at 331–32. In both the case of profit maximization and
the case of profit minimization, the difficulty of determining consumer valuations means only that
firms must work continually to improve the information they have on consumers and to adjust prices
accordingly. See Woodcock, Big Data, Price Discrimination, and Antitrust, supra note 122, at 1408 (“The
same big data revolution that is making it easier to know the characteristics of consumers is also making
it easier to know the costs faced by firms. Thus, eventually regulators will be able to go beyond
preserving the current level of consumer welfare to set prices that maximize consumer welfare, which
is only possible when costs are known, if regulators wish to do so.”).
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surplus maximization is the price that equilibrates supply and demand for the firm’s
products, because at that price every buyer willing to pay the costs of production
will make a purchase, and each purchase by a person who values a product at a level
above the cost of making the product generates additional surplus.285 At this
market-clearing price, profits are not minimized, however, unless every unit sold
happens to have the same production cost.286 To ensure that all units are sold and
surplus maximized, this market-clearing price must be at or above the cost of every
unit, which means that so long as costs are not uniform over all units the price must
be above cost for all except the most expensive units.287 Indeed, if production costs
vary enough over the units produced, then the share of surplus taken by the firm as
profits will be different for each unit sold and very far from a minimum.288
Profit minimization is clearly not possible in this example, because the firm is
constrained by its lack of information to the charging of a uniform price. But the
existence of such an example is no argument against adoption of a
profit-minimization duty. As a firm’s information on consumers improves, the firm
would be required by a profit-minimization duty to start charging lower, and
different, prices for each unit the firm sells, to ensure that each consumer pays a
price no higher than the cost of producing the particular unit that the consumer
purchases, inclusive of the constant percentage of surplus required to create the
proper incentive for the firm to maximize surplus.289
The trouble created by the imperfection of firms’ information about
consumers comes not from the resulting limits on the ability of firms actually to
minimize profits, but rather from the consumer welfare standard, which will not
permit the information-poor firm to charge the efficient uniform price while
waiting for the firm’s information to improve. The problem is that there may exist
Under an efficient profit-minimization rule, the firm would be required to
charge the uniform market-clearing price, because that price maximizes surplus, and
as the firm’s information improves, the firm would be required to start lowering
prices, on an individual unit basis, until profits are minimized without reducing the
size of the surplus. But the consumer welfare standard would not permit a firm to
take this approach. For there exists an alternative uniform price that could confer
more value on consumers than does the market-clearing price, so long as the firm’s
information remains so poor that the firm cannot charge different prices to

285. See VARIAN, supra note 130, at 306–08.
286. See FRIED, supra note 42, at 134; VARIAN, supra note 130, at 259–60.
287. See FRIED, supra note 42, at 134.
288. See id.
289. Cf. Woodcock, Big Data, Price Discrimination, and Antitrust, supra note 122, at 1408. Under
this regime, firms would have no financial incentive to improve the quality of their information on
consumers, because they would be required to use that information to reduce prices and profits. But
firms have no financial incentive to follow any part of a profit minimization duty, unless reputational
harms associated with violating the duty turn out to be significant. See supra Section II.B. Firms would
be expected to abide by the duty in the first instance because it is the law, not because firms have a
financial interest in compliance.

First to Printer_Woodcock.docx (Do Not Delete)

1448

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

6/10/20 9:12 PM

[Vol. 10:1395

different consumers.290 By reducing the uniform price that the firm charges below
the market-clearing price, the firm could actually increase consumer surplus, but at
the expense of efficiency.291 Because the firm cannot charge different prices for
different units that the firm sells, the firm would stop producing the most costly
units once the firm reduces its uniform price below the market-clearing level, and
so the surplus generated by selling those costly units would be lost.292 But the lower
uniform price charged for all other units would increase the surplus enjoyed by all
other consumers in an amount that might more than offset the losses.293 If the losses
would be offset, then the consumer welfare standard, in privileging distribution over
efficiency, would require that the firm charge this inefficient below-market price.294
The seriousness of this problem should not, however, be overstated. For one
thing, the consumer welfare standard is the law, and the law must be followed
whether it chooses distribution or efficiency.295 For another, there is no guarantee
that a lower price would attract the purchases of consumers who place the highest
value on the good. Those who place such a low value on the good that they are only
barely priced into the market by the lower price might snap up the good, in which
case the lower price would reduce consumer surplus relative to the market-clearing
price. This uncertainty regarding the effect on consumers of below-equilibrium
prices alone might be enough to prevent the consumer welfare standard from
compelling them. For yet another thing, this is a short-run problem. The
information age is fast improving the ability of firms to guess the values consumers
place on their products and to know their own marginal costs, and as firms become
better at doing that, they will, if subject to my profit-minimization rule, become
better and better at charging consumers prices that are both at-cost and efficient.296
Moreover, the surplus available for consumers to take through profit minimization
is largest only when, unsurprisingly, the firm acts to maximize surplus. So once
information increases and firms become able efficiently to reduce prices on a unit
basis, consumer surplus will come to exceed whatever value firms would be able to
offer consumers at alternative, inefficient prices. And so the consumer welfare
standard, preoccupied as it is with maximizing consumer surplus, would no longer
mandate inefficient pricing, but instead would require that firms price efficiently.297
Finally, in many markets, fixed costs are sufficiently large that firms constrained to

290. See Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 68, at 240–41.
291. The situation is identical to that of monopsony, or buyer power. See HOVENKAMP, supra
note 106, at 14–15. The powerful buyer generates profits by dictating inefficiently low prices to sellers
for the same reason that the surplus enjoyed by consumers, who after all are buyers, are maximized
when sellers charge inefficiently low prices.
292. See id.
293. See id.
294. See Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 68, at 240–41.
295. See Salop, supra note 29, at 336.
296. See Woodcock, Personalized Pricing as Monopolization, supra note 122, at 314–15.
297. See Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 68, at 240–41.
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charge uniform prices are not able to reduce their prices below efficient levels,
because that would prevent them from covering costs.298
Regardless, the courts can fix this problem, as in the case of externalities. Here,
the way to do so would be for courts to amend the consumer welfare standard to
require that firms maximize consumer welfare only when doing so would
be efficient.299
E. The Social Justice of Consumer Welfare
CSR has sought to transform the national political conversation regarding how
wealth should be distributed into a question for the corporate board to answer in
the first instance.300 Hence CSR’s insistence that the board has the power to
distribute wealth based on the board’s sense of social justice.301 By contrast,
shareholder primacy advocates want to absolve boards of distributive responsibility.

298. See VARIAN, supra note 130, at 435–37. A price insufficient to cover fixed costs ultimately
eliminates the product entirely, and therefore all surplus, including consumer surplus, that the product
generates, in violation of the consumer welfare standard. See supra Section I.C.1. Indeed, recognition of
the importance of not driving prices to marginal costs when fixed costs are large distinguishes
contemporary antitrust from mid-century antitrust, which focused on competing prices down to
marginal costs, regardless of the consequences for consumers. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
Antitrust today continues to define monopoly power in relation to marginal costs, rather than average
costs, which latter take fixed costs into account. But the rule of reason and the consumer welfare
standard nevertheless ensure that power needed to cover fixed costs is not punished today. See John
B. Kirkwood, Market Power and Antitrust Enforcement, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1169, 1188–89 (2018)
(discussing average cost as a baseline for the measurement of monopoly power); supra note 220 and
accompanying text (discussing the rule of reason).
299. Debates over whether antitrust has a consumer welfare standard or a total welfare standard
have tended to assume that a consumer welfare standard must put distribution in favor of consumers
before efficiency and that a total welfare standard can have no distributive component at all, allowing
the distributive chips to fall where they may. See Salop, supra note 29, at 336–37. In fact, a total welfare
standard, understood to mean a requirement that antitrust act to maximize surplus, can have a
distributive component. For, as argued extensively in this Article, once surplus is maximized, the
question remains to whom to pay it. See supra Section I.C. Acknowledging the analytic distinction
between efficiency (maximizing surplus) and distribution (deciding to whom to pay the surplus) opens
up new options for antitrust. In particular, it makes it possible to resolve the debate over antitrust’s
mission by accepting the total welfare standard’s admonishment that antitrust must always act in the
first instance to maximize surplus, while at the same time insisting, in the spirit of the consumer welfare
standard, that once surplus is maximized firms must turn over as much of it to consumers as is
technologically feasible to do through the charging of low prices. Cf. Baker, supra note 85, at 518
(recognizing that the distributive and efficiency questions are analytically separate and arguing that
antitrust should require efficiency, but refusing to endorse “any particular split of the efficiency gains,
so long as consumers on average do at least as well as they would absent a competition regime”).
300. That, at least, is what the Chicago School has long feared that CSR is trying to do. See
Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Sept. 13, 1970 (arguing that management should not be permitted to redistribute wealth because “[w]e
have established elaborate constitutional, parliamentary and judicial provisions to control these
functions, to assure that taxes are imposed so far as possible in accordance with the preferences and
desires of the public—after all, ‘taxation without representation’ was one of the battle cries of the
American Revolution”); Jensen, supra note 10, at 21 (suggesting that CSR is an attempt to implement
socialism through the firm).
301. See supra Section II.A.
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Hence shareholder primacy advocates’ insistence upon identifying shareholders as
the only legitimate beneficiaries of the surplus created by firms, and referring critics
seeking distributive justice for other groups to other legal regimes, such as labor law
for those interested in aiding workers.302
Despite shifting the identity of the rightful beneficiaries of firm wealth from
shareholders to consumers, my proposed antitrust duty to minimize profits would
not depart from the shareholder primacy project of denying the responsibility of
boards to resolve the question of how the nation’s wealth should be distributed.303
For example, because paying workers more than the absolute minimum they are
willing to accept amounts to giving workers a share of the surplus generated by the
firm, and a profit-minimization duty requires that boards give the entire surplus to
consumers, a profit-minimization duty would oblige boards to pay workers the
lowest possible wages.304 And the lowest possible wages could be very low indeed
if labor supply were plentiful, tax and transfer were to provide little in the way of a
safety net, the minimum wage were low, and unions were weak, as they are today.
To the extent that society would condemn such low wages, society could not, under
my proposed antitrust duty to minimize profits, seek relief by insisting that boards
drive a soft bargain with workers, as CSR would want.305
By contrast, under current law, a firm may avoid taking advantage of the weak
bargaining power of a particular group by paying the group more than the firm
would need to pay to secure the group’s services, effectively transferring a share of
the firm’s profits to the group.306 What CSR has done in defending the board’s
authority to allocate wealth is to save the board from a sharp distinction between
profits and costs, which would otherwise force the board to leverage bargaining
power to extract concessions from all groups save the one to which the board is
required to distribute profits, whether that favored group be shareholders or
consumers.307 Under current law, the board can mix profits and costs, by giving a
needy group more than the group could get away with in bare-knuckle negotiations
with the board.
An antitrust duty to minimize profits, like any legal rule that would pick a
distributive favorite (here, consumers), does not permit boards to mix profits and
costs. But a duty to minimize profits does have some distributive justice advantages
302. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 442 (arguing that the interests of workers are
protected by non-corporate-law legal regimes, such as “law of labor contracting, pension law, health
and safety law, and antidiscrimination law”); Friedman, supra note 300 (arguing that a manager acting
according to CSR principles is assuming the roles of “legislator, executive and jurist”).
303. See supra Section II.B.
304. See supra text and sources in note 104. Consistent with this approach, Amazon has in fact
explicitly invoked the consumer interest in refusing to negotiate better employment terms with workers.
See SIMON HEAD, MINDLESS WHY SMARTER MACHINES ARE MAKING DUMBER HUMANS 37–39
(2014) (decrying the “quasi-religious cult of the customer” at Walmart and Amazon).
305. See Vaheesan, supra note 64, at 664–65, 684 (attacking antitrust’s consumer welfare
standard for failing to take the interests of other groups, including workers, into account).
306. For the CSR-influenced state of current corporate law, see supra Section II.A.
307. See supra Section I.C.2.b.
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relative to a shareholder primacy rule or even to the current rule of board
discretion.308 A duty to minimize profits likely would spread wealth more evenly
across society than would shareholder primacy, because consumers are likely on
average poorer than shareholders.309 And a duty to minimize profits likely would
spread wealth more evenly than would board discretion, because a firm’s consumers
are usually more numerous than other groups that the firm’s board is likely to use
its discretion to favor, such as workers, managers, or pollution victims. Moreover,
in picking consumers as a favorite, a duty to minimize profits would have the virtue
of ensuring that groups that society may not want to enrich further, such as
shareholders or managers, have less access to the corporate pie than they do under
either shareholder primacy or board discretion.310 By contrast, board discretion has
been justly criticized for imposing no affirmative duty on boards to take distributive
justice of any kind into account, but instead merely giving boards the option to do
so, allowing them to choose to enrich management or other favored constituencies
if they wish.311
If firms were actually to obey a duty to minimize profits, the duty would create
a world in which people would expect to get rich not from their participation in
production in any capacity, because they would be unable to enjoy profits from
such participation, but from their role as consumers of valuable products sold at
low prices.312 In this sense, a pricing duty is fundamentally more democratic than
any rule that would maximize profits and turn them over to a group that participates
in production, such as shareholders, managers, or workers.313 A person tends to rely
on one or a few businesses in a lifetime for income but to participate as a consumer
in many more businesses over that time.314 As a result, when surplus is concentrated

308. For the current rule of board discretion, see supra Section II.A.
309. See Woodcock, Big Data, Price Discrimination, and Antitrust, supra note 122, at 1391 n. 111
(discussing the consequences for wealth distribution of shifting wealth from consumers to “producers,”
meaning shareholders in this context); Ireland, supra note 54, at 57–62 (discussing evidence that
shareholders in the United States tend to be wealthy).
310. See supra Section II.A.
311. See Bainbridge, supra note 82, at 1445–46 (“No informed corporate lawyer can doubt the
very real risk that some corporate directors and officers will use nonshareholder interests as a cloak for
actions taken to advance their own interests.”). While noncompliance with my profit-minimization duty
will surely limit the amount of justice actually done by the rule, it is reasonable to suppose that there
will be more compliance, and therefore more social justice, done with a weakly-enforced requirement
than with a rule that imposes no requirement to do any amount of social justice at all. See Woodcock,
supra note 14, at 1772–73.
312. See supra Section II.B.
313. See supra Section II.A.
314. To be sure, a diversified investor may obtain value from many more firms than even a
consumer with broad appetites. But even the poor are diversified consumers, in that they buy a range
of goods, from food to televisions, whereas only a fraction of the population invests, either actively or
through a retirement fund. See Ireland, supra note 54, at 57–62 (discussing share ownership);
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, REPORT 1066, CONSUMER EXPENDITURES IN 2015, at 15–16
(2017) (showing that the average consumer making less than $5,000 per year spends on everything from
cereals to entertainment).
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in firms, the individual faces a riskier wealth lottery.315 By forcing firms to pay
surplus to consumers through lower prices, instead of distributing surplus to groups
that contribute to production, whether shareholders, managers, or workers, a duty
to minimize profits reduces the risk that any one person faces of being left behind
by success.316 The average person is more likely to buy from a successful firm than
to work for, or own shares in, a successful firm, and under a profit-minimization
rule every buyer of a successful firm’s products shares in the surplus that the firm
creates. That is the world in which the duty of business is to maximize the wealth
of consumers.
CONCLUSION
The problem of corporate mission is fundamentally a problem of how the
wealth generated by firms should be distributed once all the costs of production,
including externalities, have been taken into account.317 Both advocates of
shareholder primacy and CSR have attempted to transform the fundamentally moral
question how to distribute that wealth into a technical problem of how to maximize
the wealth created by firms, by arguing that their preferred distributions are
necessary for firms to operate efficiently.318 There is, however, no necessary
relationship between economic performance and how the wealth generated by that
performance is allocated, because the wealth created by a firm—the total surplus
the firm generates—is by definition just what is left over after what is needed to
guarantee performance is paid out to shareholders, managers, workers, and other
contributors to the firm.319 While firms, and managers, do require a financial stake
in the wealth they generate in order to have an incentive to maximize it, that stake
need not extend to all or even most of the wealth they create but can be vanishingly
small without losing its incentive effects.320
CSR has succeeded at undermining shareholder primacy orthodoxy in the
interpretation of corporate law and establishing the existence of discretion in boards
of directors not only to allocate profits as boards see fit, but also to forego profits
in favor of maximizing consumer welfare.321 But that is not the same thing as
establishing that boards have a duty to minimize profits through the charging of
at-cost prices. The antitrust laws, however, do accomplish that, by imposing upon
firms, as a matter of federal law supreme over all state corporate law regimes, a duty
to maximize the welfare of consumers, which implies a duty to minimize profits.322

315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

See VARIAN, supra note 130, at 238.
See id.
See supra Sections I.A & I.C.
See supra Sections I.B.
See supra Section I.C.
See supra Section I.C.1, I.C.2.a.
See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section II.B, II.C.
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The antitrust laws therefore resolve the great debate over corporate mission in favor
neither of shareholders nor of other corporate insiders, but in favor of consumers.
While the doctrinal vehicle through which the antitrust laws accomplish this
feat, the consumer welfare standard, is an imperfect means of achieving profit
minimization, because that standard requires that firms sacrifice efficiency when
doing so would increase consumer welfare, the problem can be avoided by judicial
reinterpretation of the standard to require that firms favor consumers only when
doing so would be efficient.323 The resulting regime, in which firms maximize the
wealth they create and then turn as much of it as possible over to consumers, would
do social justice, by ensuring that the gains created by economic activity are
distributed to the one interest group in the corporate mission debates to which all
people belong.324

323.
324.

See supra Section II.D.
See supra Section II.E.
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